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ABSTRACT 
 
Geographic diversification is fundamental to risk mitigation among investors and insurers 
of housing, mortgages, and mortgage-related derivatives.  To characterize diversification 
potential, we provide estimates of integration, spatial correlation, and contagion among US 
metropolitan housing markets.  Results reveal a high and increasing level of integration 
among US markets over the decade of the 2000s, especially in California.  We apply 
integration results to assess the risk of alternative housing investment portfolios.  Portfolio 
simulation indicates reduced diversification potential and increased risk in the wake of 
estimated increases in metropolitan housing market integration.  Research findings provide 
new insights regarding the synchronous non-performance of geographically-disparate MBS 
investments during the late 2000s.     
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I. Introduction 
Geographic diversification long has been fundamental to risk mitigation among 
investors and insurers of housing, mortgages, and mortgage-related derivatives. The now 
bankrupt housing GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, built retained portfolios and provided 
credit guarantees assuming non-synchronous performance among geographically-stratified 
markets.  Wall Street employed similar logic in assembling mortgage-backed CDOs and 
related derivative securities.  The principle of geographic diversification also has been 
instrumental in the investment strategies of multi-family REITs and single-family housing 
investment funds.   
       In the wake of the recent implosion in housing and housing finance, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that geographic diversification offered few benefits.1  The efficacy of such 
strategies would be limited if metropolitan housing markets exhibited high or increasing 
levels of return integration or contagion.  In such circumstances, investors in housing, in 
mortgage-backed securities, or in residential mortgage derivatives could face substantial 
losses owing to widespread and contemporaneous co-movements in returns across 
geographically-distinct markets.  Apparently neither analysts on Wall St. nor their federal 
regulators well anticipated the magnitude of the recent house price cycle, its geographic 
ubiquity, or its seeming metropolitan contagion.      
The efficacy of geographic risk diversification also has important implications for 
the solvency of public and private mortgage insurers and for the future of government-
backed mortgage insurance.  Indeed, substantial geographic and temporal correlation of 
credit losses, when coupled with related and sizable insurer guarantee liabilities and 
constrained access to credit markets, may render private mortgage insurance less viable.  In 
                                                             
1
 The failure of mortgage pools figured importantly in the Bear Sterns and Lehman insolvencies.   
Similarly, the nonperformance of geographically-diversified mortgage portfolios played significantly in the 
collapse of the major housing savings and loan institutions.   
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the case of highly integrated markets, an alternative mechanism may be necessary to 
resolve problems of systemic risk, facilitate debt issuance, and assure financial stability.         
Despite the prevalence of geographic diversification of holdings among investors 
and insurers of mortgages and housing, few studies have explicitly examined such 
strategies.   For example, little is known about the potential for geographic risk 
diversification and whether related benefits have been eroded over the recent housing 
boom and bust.  Indeed, while the finance literature has addressed issues of correlation and 
integration among global equity markets, little attention has been paid to the same issues 
among metropolitan housing markets.  We are unaware of any prior study of the magnitude 
or trend in housing market integration, as evidenced by the relative exposure of metro 
housing returns to fluctuations in the national economy, or about related trends in housing 
portfolio risk.   Further, there exists only limited analysis of measures of contagion or 
spatial correlation in metropolitan house price returns.  Also, few studies have explicitly 
estimated temporal variation in risk associated with diversified housing investment 
portfolios.  Measures of housing integration, portfolio risk, spatial return correlation, and 
contagion provide important indications of potential benefits to portfolio diversification.  
Those measures are relevant for the full spectrum of market participants, be they portfolio 
lenders, housing and mortgage investors, homebuilders, and the like.  Further, such 
information is vital to policymakers seeking to re-structure the housing finance system and 
to mitigate catastrophic risk associated with market implosion.   
In this paper, we assess housing market integration based on the proportion of a 
MSAs housing market returns that can be explained by an identical set of national factors 
(see Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll (2009)).  The level of integration is indicated by the 
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magnitude of R-square, with higher values representing higher levels of integration.2  We 
identify variation in integration and in integration drivers over time and across MSA 
markets.  We also characterize the temporal incidence and spatial correlation of 
metropolitan house price and extreme (jump) price returns.  Based on those findings, we 
undertake additional parametric analysis of metropolitan house price contagion.  Results of 
the integration analysis are then employed to comprise alternative metropolitan housing 
investment portfolios and to assess related portfolio risk over the recent period of boom 
and bust.   
Results of the analysis indicate high levels of US metropolitan housing market 
integration.  On average, over the course of recent decades, a full 75 percent of US 
metropolitan house price returns is explained by national factors.  Further, for the US as a 
whole, housing market integration trended up over the decade of the 2000s to about .83 in 
2010.3 In California the trend was marked; there average housing market integration moved 
up from about .75 in 2000 to close to .95 in 2008!  
The 2000s bubble period also was distinguished by a relatively high incidence of 
jumps in housing returns.  Jumps were especially evident early in the boom during 2004-
2005 as well as in 2008 in the wake of the bust in house prices, the latter owing to extreme 
declines in returns in certain MSAs.   During early stages of the boom (2003 – 2004), return 
jumps in California suddenly became very prevalent with close to 70 percent of cities having 
significant extreme housing returns.  As would be expected, both in the US overall and in 
California, metropolitan return correlations were dramatically larger than jump return 
correlations in both incidence and magnitude.   
                                                             
2
 Two MSAs are viewed as perfectly integrated if those same national factors fully explain housing market 
returns in both those areas.   In that case, there would be a R-square of 1 so there is no diversification 
potential between the MSAs.   
3 A measure of 1.0 would indicate perfectly integrated markets while zero would indicate no 
integration at all; hence, the observed average of 0.83 implies that U.S. housing markets are 83% 
integrated relative to the maximum possible level. 
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We then undertake parametric assessment of spatial and temporal contagion among 
California cities, given their aberrantly high levels of integration, jump incidence, and MSA 
jump correlation.    Regression analyses over the full sample indicate that housing returns 
for Los Angeles and surrounding areas largely move in lock-step.  In contrast, Bay Area 
regional housing markets display evidence of a spatial term structure of contagion with 
housing returns in San Francisco leading those of many northern California communities.  
Contagion findings are robust to controls for booms and busts in California housing 
markets. 
Analysis of hypothetical geographically diverse housing investment portfolios 
suggests sharply rising levels of portfolio risk over the boom years of the 2000s.  Changes in 
portfolio risk correlate strongly with the degree of portfolio metropolitan housing market 
integration.  Indeed, results indicate that increases in housing market integration reduce the 
efficacy of geographic diversification strategies.  The combination of those factors left 
investors and insurers of housing credit risk exposed to the recent market implosion.   
Taken together, our findings offer a cautionary tale about portfolio geographic 
diversification as a mechanism to mitigate housing risk.  High levels of housing market 
integration suggest that local fundamentals are less important to reduction in risk than 
previously thought.  The results have far-reaching implications for policymakers.  They 
underscore the fact that investors and insurers of housing and mortgages must be able to 
withstand high levels of systemic risk.  In the absence of such capacity, credit losses 
associated with a severe housing downturn may result in the withdrawal of mortgage 
funding liquidity from the marketplace.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section II presents the integration method and 
presents results of analysis of integration of US MSA house price returns.   Section III 
reports on analyses of both contemporaneous and lagged correlations and jump 
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correlations in MSA house price returns.  Section IV provides tests of geographic-temporal 
contagion among MSA housing markets in California.  Section V presents analysis of 
temporal variation in risk among simulated housing investment portfolios.   In section VI, 
we provide concluding remarks. 
 
II. Integration  
Substantial research has been undertaken as regards integration of international equity 
markets.  The applications vary in geography of focus, as some papers address integration 
in the European community (see, for example, Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and Priestley 
(2006), and Schotman and Zalewska (2006)), whereas others investigate emerging markets 
(see, for example, Bakaert and Harvey (1995), Chamber and Gibson (2006), Bakaert, 
Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2008)). The analyses also vary widely in methodological 
approach.  For instance, Carrieri, Errunza and Hogan (2007) use GARCH-in-mean methods 
to assess correlation in returns and volatility between markets, whereas Longin and Solnik 
(1995) use cointegration techniques.  While integration is often described in terms of cross-
country correlations in stock returns (for an early study see King and Wadhwani (1990)), 
such a measure is argued to be flawed.  Indeed, in the case where multiple factors drive 
returns, markets may be imperfectly correlated but perfectly integrated.4    
As suggested by Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll (2009), a simple intuitive measure of 
financial market integration is the proportion of a country’s returns that can be explained 
                                                             
4 As shown by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), while perfect integration implies that identical global 
factors fully explain index returns across countries, some countries may differ in their sensitivities to 
those factors and accordingly not exhibit perfect correlation.  An easy intuitive example would be an 
energy-exporting country such as Saudi Arabia and an energy-importing country such as Hong Kong.   
Both countries might be positively associated with global factors such as consumer goods or financial 
services.  Moreover, both countries could be fully integrated in the global economy; yet the simple 
correlation between their stock market returns could be relatively small, or even negative, because 
higher energy price increase Saudi equity values and decrease Hong Kong equity values.  As a 
consequence, the extent to which the multi-factors drive returns is a better indication of likely 
diversification benefits than a correlation measure.   
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by an identical set of global factors.  This measure of integration focuses on the magnitude 
of country-specific residual variance in a factor model seeking to explain a broadly-defined 
country equity return index.5  Clearly, to the extent global factors explain only a small 
proportion of variance in a country’s returns, the country would be viewed as less 
integrated (see, for example, Stulz (1981) and Errunza and Losq (1985)).6  In contrast, 
markets would be viewed as highly integrated to the extent their returns are well explained.  
We below describe US metropolitan housing markets as highly integrated if identical US 
national factors explain a large portion of the variance in MSA-specific house price returns.   
To compute US housing market integration, we regress metropolitan house price returns on 
an identical set of national economic and housing market fundamentals.  
Integration is viewed as important to investors, policymakers, and market participants 
in general.  A measure of housing market integration provides an indication of the benefits 
to investor diversification among MSA markets.  As shown below, while there are some 
benefits to diversifying away MSA-specific housing risk, those benefits decline with 
increases in integration.  Indeed, high levels of integration may mitigate strategies of 
geographic diversification among investors in housing funds or mortgage-backed securities.  
Also, among other things, a measure of metro housing market integration would provide 
policymakers with some indication of the geographic propagation of macroeconomic shocks 
or national economic policy.   This will have relevance for all market participants, including 
institutional investors in residential MBS as well as those who regulate housing, the housing 
GSEs, mortgage lenders, and related financial institutions. 
                                                             
5 In contrast, in the presence of multiple national factors, the simple correlation between MSA house 
price return indexes could be a flawed measure of integration unless those MSAs have identical 
exposure to the national factors, e.g., unless the estimated coefficient vectors are exactly proportional 
across MSAs.  
 
6 According to this definition, a country is perfectly integrated if the country-specific variance is zero 
after controlling for global factors.  In the case of two perfectly integrated countries, market indexes 
would have zero residual variance.  See Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) for discussion and details. 
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a. Model Specification and Data 
MSA-specific house price returns are computed using the U.S. Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) metropolitan indices, previously known as the OFHEO house price 
series.  The FHFA series are weighted repeat-sale price indices associated with single-family 
homes.  Home sales and refinancing activity included in the FHFA sample derive from 
conventional home purchase mortgage loans conforming to the underwriting requirements 
of the housing Government Sponsored Enterprises—the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). 
This is likely to reduce the estimation of total risk in the underlying US housing markets.  
Nevertheless, the FHFA data comprise the most extensive cross-sectional and time-series 
set of quality-adjusted house price indices available in the United States.7   We compute 
house price returns for each MSA in our sample as the log quarterly difference in its repeat 
home sales price index.8  The MSA level data are quarterly from 1975:Q1 – 2010:Q1. The 
number of MSAs in the database increases over time from 2 in 1975 to 380 by 1993.  By the 
end of the sample timeframe, there are 384 MSAs in the dataset.  
Per above, for each MSA in the sample, log percent change in the MSA-specific house 
price indices is regressed on a common set of national economic, financial and housing 
market factors.  The specific factors and their definitions are displayed in Appendix Table 1.  
The factors include measures of change in population, payroll employment, unemployment 
rate, S&P500, industrial production, CPI, and PPI materials prices as well as personal 
                                                             
 
7 For a full discussion of the OFHEO house price index, see “A Comparison of House Price Measures”, 
Mimeo, Freddie Mac, February 28, 2008. 
 
8 In principle, it would be desirable to model house prices at higher frequencies.  Unfortunately, 
monthly quality-adjusted house price indices are available from OFHEO only for Census Divisions 
(N=18) and only for a much shorter time frame. 
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income, consumer sentiment, single-family building permits, Fed Funds rate, 10-year 
constant maturity Treasury yields, and the like.  All factor data are quarterly in frequency 
from 1975:Q1 – 2010:Q1 with the exception of consumer sentiment, which is available from 
1977:Q4.  Data for the factors are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED 
(Federal Reserve Economic Data) with the exception of the S&P500 (Datastream) and 
personal income (US Department of Commerce National Income and Product Accounts).  
The MSA returns series are pre-whitened to remove serial correlation.  A VAR(1) is 
employed based on optimal AIC/BIC criteria from running the factor model on each 
individual MSA.  The average level of integration is measured by the R-squares from the 
multi-factor model fitted for a 20-quarter moving window for the samples of MSAs (the use 
of other window sizes gave the same qualitative results).  The R-squares in these moving 
windows indicate the corresponding levels of housing market integration.  Changes in R-
squares represent the change in the degree of market integration and this is the primary 
purpose of the factor model.   
b. Return Regressions on National Factors 
Estimation results indicate that U.S. MSA housing market integration has increased 
over time.  Figure 2 provides information on trends in housing market integration for the 
MSAs in our sample.  Panel A of Figure 2 shows that trend for the 1983:Q4 – 2009-Q4 period 
both for the national and California samples.  A first salient point is the high level of 
integration evidenced among metro US housing markets over the period since the early 
1980s.  On average, some 75 percent of MSA house price returns is explained by national 
factors.  Further, the 2000s provides graphic evidence of trending up in housing market 
integration among US MSAs, from about .70 in 2000 to approximately .83 by decade’s end.   
In California the trend in housing market integration was even more marked moving up 
from about .75 in 2000 to close to .95 in 2008!  Further noteworthy, however, was the 
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abrupt downward adjustment in California housing market integration, to approximately 
.75, in the wake of the recent severe implosion in house prices.  Despite that trending down 
in R-square among California MSAs, those markets remained highly integrated.      
We control for potential bias in the FHFA data in terms of when an MSA was 
included in the database.  Regardless, the finding of increased integration still holds.  Panel 
B of Figure 2 shows the average R-square pattern for 3 time cohorts.  This categorization of 
MSAs into cohorts assesses the robustness of results to the timeframe of city inclusion in 
the sample.  In this regard, it is possible that MSAs that entered the sample later were 
characterized by lower or higher R-squares.  If that were the case, averaging all MSAs 
together could move the trend in the average either up or down.  We plotted trends in the 
average level of integration for three time-based cohorts.  The cohorts included the full 
timeframe of 1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1 (cohort 1), 1989:Q2 – 2010:Q1 (cohort 2), and 1992:Q1 – 
2010:Q1 (cohort 3).  The cohorts yielded roughly similar results and indicated a longer-
term trend towards MSA housing market integration.  In cohort 2, for example, the average 
R-square moved up from about .65 in 1989 to almost .82 in 2010.   
MSA housing market cross-sectional and time-series summary statistics are 
contained in Table 1.   For the sample of MSAs, we display mean quarterly house price 
returns, standard deviation of returns (sigma), the R-square measure of integration, the 
change in R-square over the timeframe of the analysis, and the associated time trend t-
statistic (R-squares for each MSA are fit to a simple linear time trend for all available 
quarters).   Minimum values by quintile are also presented.  First, it is important to note that 
risk and return associated with housing has been substantial.  As shown, the average 
quarterly return for all MSA housing markets in the sample is positive at almost 1% with an 
average deviation of about 2.5%.  Many real estate investors believe housing represents a 
high return low risk asset class but this is not borne out by the data.  Moreover, we see 
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substantial cross sectional variation in those measures; for example, mean house price 
return varies from a minimum 0.43% to a sample maximum of 1.89%.   
As evidenced in Table 1, the mean final period R-square of the integration model is 
.82, suggesting the importance of national factors in determination of MSA house price 
returns.  This very high level of average integration will constrain investors in diversifying 
risk geographically in the U.S.  The Table also indicates substantial temporal and cross-MSA 
variation in the integration measure.  On average R-squares increase by almost 10 percent 
from the beginning to end of sample.  In some areas, national economic and housing market 
fundamentals fail to explain the majority of variation in MSA-specific house price returns 
(min R-squared = .35)  At a maximum, those same fundamentals explain a full 99 percent of 
variation in MSA-specific house price returns.  There is also substantial variation in the 
change in R-squared across the sample with a standard deviation of .187.   Appendix Table 2 
contains integration details for all 384 MSAs.9   
Table 2 presents integration details for the 28 California MSAs included in our 
dataset.  Relative to the full national sample of 384 MSAs, California metropolitan areas are 
characterized by elevated mean house price returns, return volatility, and integration time 
trend t-statistic.  Further discernible in Table 2 are distinct coastal versus inland housing 
market phenomena.  Comparing coastal MSAs (see, for example, San Francisco, Oakland, San 
Jose, Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and Santa Barbara) with inland MSAs (for example, 
Bakersfield, Fresno, Madera, Merced, Modesto, Riverside, and Sacramento), note that the 
former are roughly characterized by relatively higher mean house price returns, lower 
return volatility, damped levels of integration, and lower integration trend t-statistics.  
Among California coastal MSAs, mean quarterly returns averaged an elevated 1.6 percent; 
                                                             
9 The table further provides the quintile and rank (from lowest to highest) across the 384 MSAs of 
returns, sigma, and integration time trend t-statistic.   
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further, integration R-squared averaged .69 with an insignificant time trend t-statistic.  In 
marked contrast, California Central Valley and Inland Empire cities displayed substantially 
lower mean house price returns, elevated return volatility, higher levels of integration, and 
higher integration trend t-stats.  In inland areas, mean quarterly house price returns were a 
damped 1 percent with an elevated sigma of 3.4 percent; further, the t-statistic on the 
integration time trend was 2.2, well in excess of t-statistics for California coastal MSAs and 
for the nation as a whole.   
Panel C of Figure 2 shows trends in average R-square for inland and coastal MSAs in 
California.  As is evident, average integration for MSAs in both areas trended up over the 
late-1990s through 2008 period.  There is a striking up and down pattern in integration, 
roughly coinciding with the boom and bust in housing markets overall.  While integration 
levels for California MSAs moved up from about .75 to in excess of .90 in the context of the 
2000s cyclical boom in housing, those same measures fell back markedly during the 
subsequent bust as California housing returns became increasingly divorced from national 
economic fundamentals.  Further, the chart is suggestive that localized factors recently 
played a substantially greater role in determination of coastal California house price 
returns, as suggested in the divergence in integration between coastal and inland areas in 
the context of the implosion in housing markets.  That divergence likely reflected special 
factors supportive of the performance of coastal markets (housing supply constraint, 
desirable natural amenities, shorter commutes, and the like) in the context of ongoing 
weakness in national economic and housing market fundamentals.  As was broadly 
reported, Central Valley and Inland Empire cities collectively comprised the epicentre of the 
2000s boom-bust cycle in California housing markets.  Those areas were characterized by 
high levels of subprime lending, elastic land and housing supply, longer commutes, and 
substantial overbuilding.  In many cases, the interior MSAs are outer-ring bedroom 
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communities for employment centers closer to the coast.  The results suggest distinctions in 
housing return phenomena both within and between California MSAs and the nation as a 
whole.   
c. Integration Drivers 
In addition to the varying levels of increased integration recorded across MSAs and 
over time, combined with a similar finding for the incidence of large (boom and bust) price 
changes (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011; 2012; Sinai, 2011), we now turn our attention to the 
drivers of integration.  We find strong evidence of both temporal and geographical variation 
in factors driving integration in US housing markets.  Figure 3 displays time-series 
estimates of selected integration drivers.  The factor estimates are provided for primary 
interest rate, unemployment rate, and income terms.  As above, the time-series reflect the 
average of 20-quarter moving window factor estimates from MSA-specific integration 
regressions.  As shown in the exhibits, the time-series are presented both for the national 
and California MSA samples.    
Panel A of Figure 3 plots the factor time-series coefficients for the log Federal Funds 
Rate.  As anticipated, for both the US and California samples, the estimated coefficients are 
largely negative (the average for the full sample is -0.02).  In both samples, however, the 
average of the factor estimates turns positive early in the time-series.  The positive 
estimates may be associated with the mid-1980s advent and proliferation of adjustable-rate 
mortgages.  As is commonly appreciated, the ARMs were priced off of short-term risk-free 
rates.  Indeed, the new ARM products enabled the qualification for home purchase of large 
numbers of new borrowers and may have served to increase effective demand and related 
returns on housing.  Also evident in the plot are the somewhat larger sort-term interest rate 
effects estimated for California.  In that regard, California housing markets appear to have 
been more sensitive to movements in the target rate of monetary policy in the wake of the 
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implosion in the savings and loan sector and related downturn of the early 1990s.  Similarly, 
our estimates reveal larger negative factor loadings associated with the Fed Funds Rate 
among California housing markets over much of the 2000s.  During much of the 2000s, 
many California housing markets were relatively unaffordable, such that changes in short-
term rates figured importantly to nominal mortgage qualification and effective housing 
demand.  Further, as shown in Nichols et al (2012), land prices are more volatile than 
structure prices; in areas such as California where land values comprise a larger share of 
house values, we would expect to see more of a response of house values to changes in the 
cost of credit.   
Panel B plots factor estimates for the log national unemployment rate.  Again, as 
anticipated, with few exceptions, those values are negative on average for the national 
sample and for California MSAs.  Striking are the exaggerated swings in coefficients for 
California in the final years of the 2000s.  Further inspection of estimated unemployment 
factor loadings indicate that result was driven entirely by California inland cities, including 
those of the Central Valley and Inland Empire.  Indeed, as suggested above, California’s 
inland cities comprised the epicentre of the housing bust.  In those areas, unemployment 
rates spiked to levels substantially in excess of the national average.  Indeed, in the context 
of local economic distress, typically associated with implosion in residential construction, 
the estimated unemployment rate coefficients of inland California cities turned 
substantially more negative than for the nation as a whole.   
Panel C plots factor estimates for log personal income.  As would be expected, the 
income factor estimates are largely positive over most of the decade of the 2000s, both for 
the U.S. MSAs and for those in California.  Noteworthy here as well are the large income 
effects estimated for California cities during the peak housing boom years.  As boom turned 
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to bust, the California income estimates converged on those of the larger U.S. metropolitan 
sample. 
 
III. MSA Return and Jump Return Correlations 
In this section, we investigate the magnitude of metropolitan house price returns, 
distinguishing between common and extreme movements (jumps).  Those results are 
benchmarked by a discussion of contemporaneous and lagged correlations in MSA house 
price returns.  The analysis provides insights about temporal and geographic variations in 
those measures; we pay particular attention to California MSAs.     
To the extent that extreme movements in MSA house price returns are few in number or 
geographically random, they would be of limited consequence to either private investors or 
policymakers.  On the other hand, higher levels of ubiquity in return or jump return 
correlations raise concerns for mortgage or housing investors seeking to diversify risks 
associated with extreme house price movements.  In a similar vein, other market players 
including MBS originators and investors would be similarly impacted by high correlations 
in returns or jump returns among their mortgage assets.   Note further that jumps or jump 
correlations may be driven by economic or policy shocks at local or national levels.  Jumps 
in house price returns should be of interest to policymakers especially in those cases where 
jumps can be traced to political events or policy perturbations.   
Prior analyses have proposed alternative measures of jump test statistics (see, for 
example, Barndorff-Nielson and Shepard (2006), Lee and Mykland (2008), Jiang and Oomen 
(2008), and Jacod and Todorov (2009)).  In a recent paper, Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll 
(2010) assess the various jump statistics in application to stock return indexes for 82 
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countries.10    Unlike the other measures, Lee and Mykland works well with single 
observations (as opposed to a sample of several observations).  This is important for our 
application because we have only quarterly data and hence the sample size is more limited 
than in the case of equities, where daily observations are available.  While results vary 
across alternative jump statistics, results of of the above cited research suggest that jumps 
are largely idiosyncratic in international equity indexes. We are not aware of prior analyses 
of jumps in metropolitan house prices returns.   
For the vast majority of sampled MSA housing markets, the most frequent quality-
adjusted house price index available to investors is quarterly.  Moreover, investor 
rebalancing of real estate portfolios tends to be of lower frequency relative to that of 
equities, and commonly is at a quarterly interval.  Consequently, we view such frequency as 
appropriate to investor and policymaker market assessment and hence for the jump 
analysis.            
With that in mind, we apply the Lee and Mykland (2008), (hereafter LM), method in 
assessment of extreme movements in US metropolitan house price indexes.  Like Barndorff-
Nielson and Shephard (2006), Lee and Mykland’s (2008) test is based on bipower variation.  
Bipower variation is used to proxy the instantaneous variance of the continuous non-jump 
component of prices.   
 To understand the test, consider the following notation: 
t, subscript for quarter  
Tk, the number of quarters in subperiod k 
K, the total number of available subperiods 
                                                             
10 Earlier work on extreme returns and correlation of same focused on more ad-hoc approaches (see 
Longin and Solnik, 2001). 
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Ri,t,k, the return (log price relative) for MSA i quarter t in subperiod k 
The Barndorff-Nielson and Shepard (2006) and Lee and Mykland (2008) bipower variation, 
Bi,k,is defined as follows: 
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LM suggest the computation of bipower variation using data preceding a particular return 
observation being tested for a jump.  The test statistic is L =        √     .  Under the null 
hypothesis of no jump at t+1, LM show that  √    converges to a unit normal.  In addition, 
if there is a jump at t+1,  √    is equal to a unit normal plus the jump scaled by the 
standard deviation of the continuous portion of the process. 
Jumps in housing returns, although frequent, do not occur as often as in equity 
returns (see Roll and Pukthuanthong-Le (2010)).  In Figure 4, we describe the temporal 
incidence of big LM jumps in house price returns for US MSAs.  For each quarter, we plot the 
percentage of LM statistics in excess of 2.0.  That percentage is plotted from 1983:Q4 – 
2010:Q1.  Since the L statistic is asymptotically unit normal, we adopt a 10 percent criterion 
for each tail.  In other words, we identify a non-normal (jump) quarter for each MSA when 
the absolute value of the LM statistic exceeds the 10 percent level for the unit normal (1.65).     
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the quarterly incidence of big LM jumps for the full sample 
of 384 MSAs.  Some evidence of jumps in house price returns is indicated for the overheated 
housing markets of the late 1980s with an incidence rate often in excess of 10 percent.  
Jumps fell back during the downturn of the early 1990s and were similarly damped from 
the mid-1990s through about 2003.  In fact, results indicate a large number of quarters 
during the 1995 – 2003 period for which few if any US MSAs were characterized by 
statistical jumps in house prices returns.   
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As is evident, the 2000s bubble period was characterized by substantial jump 
incidence.  Jumps were especially evident early in the boom during 2004-2005 as well as in 
2008 in the wake of the bust in house prices.  The latter set of jumps likely was associated 
with extreme declines in house price returns in a small percentage of metropolitan areas.  
As in the above integration analysis, we assess jumps across inland and coastal 
California MSAs (Figure 4, panel B).    In contrast to the US as a whole, analysis for within 
California suggests virtually no statistical jumps in house price returns prior to 2003.  
However, during the early stages of the boom period (2003 – 2004), return jumps suddenly 
became very prevalent with close to 70 percent of California MSAs having significant 
extreme returns.  The jumps in returns were evidenced among both coastal and inland 
California cities; indeed, the plots reveal little difference in either the timing or incidence of 
house price jumps among MSAs in those areas.  In marked contrast, substantially elevated 
incidence of significant extreme values (LM return jumps) was indicated during the bust 
2007-2008 period only for inland California MSAs!  Indeed, there is no evidence of jumps in 
returns during the latter period for coastal cities.  The jumps evidenced for inland California 
cities during the bust period likely reflect the sharp house price declines that were common 
in those areas.  Such outcomes were consistent with the implosion in housing market 
drivers.   As suggested above, unlike coastal areas, inland cities were characterized by lack 
of (regulatory or natural) constraint on housing supply and were substantially overbuilt.  
Further, inland areas shared a common feature of substantial boom period subprime 
lending. As boom turned to bust, inland areas of California quickly and largely imploded.  
While the preceding indicates the marked incidence of house price return jumps during the 
2000s housing boom and bust, they provide little insight as regards contemporaneous or 
lagged MSA correlations in those jumps, and returns in general.  We turn now to those 
analyses.            
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First, a word on methodology.  Per above and following Pukthuanthong-Le and Roll  
(2010), we identify periods when the L statistic indicates a likely jump.   After classifying 
each sample quarter for each MSA as jump or non-jump (jump indicated in those cases 
where the absolute value of the LM L statistics is greater than 2.0, given that L is unit 
normal), we compute contemporaneous and lagged correlations in LM jump statistics 
among pairs of MSAs where at least one MSA had a jump.  If the companion MSA also had a 
jump in the same quarter (or in the lagged quarter) the product of their LM measures 
contributes to the contemporaneous (or lagged) correlation.  Otherwise, the contribution 
for that month is zero.  Note that we do not count the LM statistic for a given quarter unless 
it is significant; this is appropriate, otherwise the resulting correlation would simply 
measure the total return correlation.   The result of our procedure is a pure measure of 
jump correlation for every pair of MSAs.  
We find extensive evidence of strong correlations in returns and jumps.  But jumps 
occur infrequently and have smaller correlations than returns.  California exhibits 
particularly large return and jump correlations.  In Table 3, we report summary information 
on MSA house price return and jump return correlations.  Panel A reports summary 
statistics for MSA return correlations, which provide a basis of comparison to MSA jump 
correlations.   Those results are stratified by level of T-statistic for cross-coefficient 
independence.  For the full sample, correlation coefficients are computed for quarterly 
returns among all house price return pairs (total sample N = 73,536).  The mean 
contemporaneous correlation among all MSAs return pairs is 0.20, with considerable cross 
coefficient standard deviation of 0.18.  However, the T-statistic for the mean correlation, 
assuming cross-coefficient independence, is almost 300, indicating very significant average 
correlation among MSA returns.   The table further indicates sizable numbers of individual 
MSA pairs with house price return correlations at high levels of statistical significance. The 
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numbers of MSA pairs with return correlation T-statistics in excess of 2 and 3 are 33,460 
and 18,126, respectively.  Among those same sub-samples, mean correlations are 0.35 and 
0.44, respectively.   
Panel B of Table 3 reports summary statistics for the corresponding jump return 
correlations stratified by T-statistic.  For the full sample, correlation coefficients are 
computed for identified jumps in quarterly house price returns among US MSAs.  There are 
49,742 pairs.  The summary statistics are computed across all available coefficients.  The 
mean contemporaneous MSA jump correlation across MSA jump return pairs is only about 
0.05 but is significant with a T-statistic of about 53.  The Table further indicates the 
existence of MSA house price jump return correlations at higher levels of statistical 
significance. The numbers of MSA pairs with jump return correlation T-statistics in excess 
of 2 and 3 are 8770 and 5405, respectively.  Among these more significant sub-samples, 
mean correlations as expected are substantially higher (0.38 and 0.46, respectively.)  And 
these samples are similarly characterized by significant MSA jump mean correlations, as 
indicated by T-statistics of 237 and 247, respectively.   
We now turn to identify the geographical incidence of significant return and jump 
correlations in metropolitan housing returns.  We find strong evidence for a high incidence 
of significant return and jump return correlations for California.  In panel A of Table 4, 
contemporaneous and lead MSA house price index return correlations coefficients are 
computed for US census divisions.  In that analysis, we break out California MSAs.  
Accordingly, the definition of census division 1 is now non-standard, as we remove 
California from that division.  As is evident in the top left-hand panel, the incidence of MSA 
house price return correlations varies substantially across US census divisions.   For each 
division, the number and proportion of significant correlations (using a T-stat of 5 or above) 
are reported.  The mean correlation for each region is also given.  The vast majority of 
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census divisions, including divisions 1 – 8, report only limited contemporaneous 
correlations in MSA house price returns.   Specifically, divisions 1 – 8 report a mean 
correlation coefficient in the range of 0.2 – 0.3 with not more than around 20 percent highly 
significant.  California appears to be different from the rest of the U.S. in that 92 percent of 
the MSA paired returns are significantly contemporaneously correlated!  Further, the mean 
correlation level for California MSAs is about .66!      
As reported in the top right-hand panel of table 4, intertemporal (lead one quarter 
ahead) correlations are similarly damped in most census divisions.  Among divisions 1 - 8, 
less than 10 percent of lead correlations are statistically significant.  Further, mean lead 
correlation levels remain at or below .20.  In marked contrast, MSAs in New England 
(division 9) and California are characterized by relatively high percentages of significant 
and elevated lead correlations.  Again California is the outlier, as in excess of three-quarters 
of California MSAs recorded significant lead return correlations with a mean correlation 
level of about .57.   
Panel B reports a similar assessment of contemporaneous and lead LM jump return 
correlations among MSAs stratified by census division.  As shown in the bottom panels, 
California is conspicuously different from the rest of the U.S.  For census divisions 1 – 8, 
significant contemporaneous jump correlations are small in number (less than 10 percent 
in any division) and mean correlations coefficients are in the range of only .02 – .03.  In 
those same areas, lead jump correlations are limited to an incidence of 6 percent or less in 
any division with mean correlation coefficients (except for New England) of .04 or less.  In 
marked contrast, jump return contemporaneous correlations are significant among 
California MSAs at an occurrence rate of 34 percent, and with much larger values, reaching 
.22, substantially in excess of levels discussed above for other regions.  Moreover, the mean 
lead jump correlations are highest for California. 
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Another clear message results from the correlation analysis in US housing markets 
and when broken down into geographical cohorts.  The incidence of significant return 
correlations far exceeds jump correlations.  To illustrate, the percentage with significant t-
statistics greater than 2 is in excess of 45 percent for return correlations compared to 
approximately 18 percent for jump return correlations (see Table 3).  When we break out 
the analysis into geographical cohorts we find that the ratio of significant t-statistics far 
greater for return correlations with three exceptions, that occur in Divisions 3 through 5 for 
lead values (see Table 4).  The results pertaining to the magnitude of correlations across 
return and jump returns are even more clear-cut.  In all comparisons, we find that the 
return correlations far exceed their jump counterparts, usually by a ratio of 5 or more! 
In addition, analyses of contemporaneous and lead jumps in house price returns again 
suggest that California is different.  Also, levels of contemporaneous and lead return and 
jump correlations in California were well in excess of levels recorded in other census 
divisions.  Given the anomalous behavior of California metropolitan housing markets thus 
documented we now turn to identify further insights as regards the temporal – spatial 
structure of house price return contagion in this state.  
 
IV. Contagion in Housing Market Returns 
The above analyses suggest the outlier status of California MSAs in assessment of recent 
house price phenomena.  Specifically, our analyses point to rising levels of integration as 
well as elevated return correlation and jump return correlation, both lead and 
contemporaneous, among California MSAs.  However, the spatial dimensions of those 
relationships were not specified.  Below we address that issue via parametric assessment of 
the spatial dynamics of housing returns among MSAs in northern and southern California.   
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We report some interesting findings for the metropolitan housing markets in California.  
In particular, spatial return spillovers are largely efficient across MSAs, especially in 
Southern California, coming from Los Angeles to surrounding areas.  Results of a first set of 
analyses are contained in Table 5.  There we test the simple hypothesis that house price 
returns among primary California coastal MSAs lead those of surrounding areas.  That 
hypothesis is consistent with a mechanism whereby increases in house price returns (and 
related declines in affordability) in expensive, supply-constrained, coastal metropolitan 
areas lead to out-migration, related demand-side pressures, and subsequent increases in 
returns in more affordable inland suburbs.  In our test of that hypothesis for southern 
California, for example, we estimate city-specific regressions whereby we regress returns 
for each inner- and outer-ring suburb of the larger LA area on contemporaneous and lead 
Los Angeles MSA house price returns.  We undertake identical analyses for the Bay Area and 
central California using San Francisco and Santa Barbara as primary coastal cities.  As 
shown in Table 5, we estimate those equations over the full timeframe of the metro-specific 
data sets.  In each case, MSA returns are regressed on contemporaneous and 3 quarterly 
lags of primary coastal MSA returns.    
Results of the analysis for LA region MSAs are contained in the top panel of Table 5.  
Those findings indicate a market efficiency in metropolitan spillover returns in that the 
most significant effects are contemporaneous.  Overall, the regressions are characterized by 
high levels of explanatory power.  In all of LA’s surrounding cities, including Bakersfield, 
Fresno, Oxnard-Thousand Oaks, Riverside, San Diego, Santa Ana, and Santa Barbara, sizable 
and highly significant coefficients are estimated for contemporaneous Los Angeles house 
price returns.  In Bakersfield and Fresno, located further from Los Angeles in California’s 
great central valley, the contemporaneous coefficients on Los Angeles house price returns 
are about .60 and highly significant; further, a positive and significant coefficient of about 
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.30 is estimated on the first quarterly lag of Los Angeles house price returns.  In marked 
contrast, in closer-in areas, only the contemporaneous coefficient was statistically 
significant.  Indeed, in those cities, the estimated coefficients on contemporaneous 
(quarterly) changes in Los Angeles house price returns were close to 1!   These analyses 
indicate a high degree of contemporaneous correlation in house price returns among Los 
Angeles and its suburbs.  
Results of the analysis diverge somewhat for San Francisco and environs where the 
level of market efficiency appears to be somewhat lower.  In most areas of northern 
California, including Oakland, Sacramento, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Rosa, and Santa Cruz, 
both contemporaneous and 1-quarter lagged San Francisco house price returns play a 
sizable and significant role in determination of house price returns.  In a few places, 
including both Oakland and Santa Cruz, contemporaneous as well as 1- and 2-quarter 
lagged San Francisco house prices returns significantly affect surrounding outcomes.  San 
Francisco house price returns lead those of the outer-ring Central Valley boom town of 
Modesto by 1-quarter.  In short, findings for Bay Area regional housing markets suggest a 
spatial term structure of contagion, whereas results for Los Angeles indicate a southern 
California region where metropolitan housing returns largely move in lock-step.   
The above findings, however, may not be robust to periods of boom and bust in 
California housing markets.  Indeed, it is plausible that the spatial or temporal path of house 
price contagion might accelerate during a boom or decelerate and even reverse during a 
bust.  We test for such effects in Table 6.  The regression equations estimated in Table 6 are 
identical to those in Table 5, except that each regression contains 4 additional terms.  The 
additional variables comprise interactions between the primary (explanatory) city’s return 
(contemporaneous and 3 quarterly lags) and a contemporaneous residual from a time trend 
fit of the log of an equal-weighted index of California house prices.    
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Findings contained in table 6 indicate that results of the California MSA house price 
contagion analysis are largely robust to the inclusion of the boom and bust interactive 
terms.  In southern California, an exception is Bakersfield, where a sizable and significant 
coefficient is estimated on second quarterly lagged interaction term.  In northern California, 
there exists little to report other than significant coefficients on contemporaneous 
interactive terms for Santa Rosa and Santa Cruz.  Accordingly, an explicit accounting for 
boom and bust periods in California’s housing markets has little effect on conclusions 
regarding the temporal path of house price contagion among California MSAs.11   
 
V. MSA Return Integration and Portfolio Risk Diversification   
Finally, we assess the relationship between portfolio diversification, integration, and 
risk for U.S. metropolitan housing markets.  As suggested above, portfolio geographic 
diversification long has been fundamental to risk mitigation among investors and insurers 
of housing, mortgages, and mortgage-related derivatives.  For example, Freddie Mac sought 
to geographically diversify their single-family loan portfolio to reduce credit risks arising 
from changing local economic conditions.12  Wall St. similarly employed such logic in 
assembling mortgage-backed CDOs and related derivative securities.  Newly-formed single-
family housing investment funds and large, multifamily REITs also have employed 
geographic diversification as a strategy to mitigate portfolio risk.13,14 
                                                             
11 We undertook yet another robustness check whereby we created an interaction between the 
explanatory’s city’s return (including four lags) and a contemporaneous residual from a time trend fit 
of the log of an equal-weighted California MSA (N=28) FHFA house price index.    That interaction 
term was substituted for the primary coastal city boom and bust interaction term estimated in Table 
6.  Results here differed little from those reported in table 6, as the house price index for the state as 
a whole differed little from those for the primary coastal California cities. 
12
 See Freddie Mac Annual Report, 2007 (pg 97). 
13
 Colony Capital, for example, has sought to reduce risk via geographically diversification of the holdings 
of its single-family housing hedge fund. 
14
 See, for example, explicit statements on the intended benefits of geographic diversification as appear in 
the 10-Ks of large residential REITs including Mid-America Apartment Communities and Apartment 
Investment and Management Company (AIV). 
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To undertake this analysis, we comprise equal-weighted portfolios for our longest-
running U.S. and California metropolitan house price returns cohorts (1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1 
and 1994:Q4 – 2010:Q1, respectively).   Per convention, we employ the standard deviation 
of housing returns as a measure of portfolio risk.  Return volatility is computed for each 
MSA using a 20-quarter moving window.  Diversification is measured by the degree of risk 
mitigation of the portfolio, computed as the difference between average MSA risk and 
portfolio risk, relative to average MSA risk.   
Figures 5A and 5B provide evidence of portfolio risk, integration, and diversification for 
the cohort of U.S. metropolitan areas.  As shown in the time-series, the integration and risk 
metrics track one another.  Particularly evident is the strong upward movement in both 
measures during the housing boom years of the 2000s.15  Integration of metropolitan house 
price returns moved up from about .72 on average at start of decade to approximately .88 in 
2008.  During that same period, portfolio risk, as proxied by sigma, rose from 0.5 to almost 
2.5.  The simple correlation coefficient between the R-square and sigma measures was 
roughly .60 over the full term of the time-series.  During the decade of the 2000s, the 
correlation coefficient rose to .76. 
The strong, positive correlation between portfolio integration and portfolio risk 
suggests limitations to portfolio geographic diversification as a method of risk mitigation.  
Trends in those estimates are displayed in panel 5B.  The chart reveals a sizable inverse 
correlation between measures of portfolio integration and diversification; over the full 
timeframe of the analysis, the simple correlation coefficient was -.53.  Further, that 
relationship became more pronounced during the 2000s, moving to -.76.       
Results of similar analyses for California MSAs are contained in panels 5C and 5D.  As 
shown in panel 5A, trends in average integration of California housing markets appear to 
                                                             
15
 Note the relationship between correlated jumps and diversification is similar; increased incidence of 
correlated jumps results in lower diversification possibilities. 
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roughly track California housing portfolio risk.  Indeed, the ups and downs in these series 
are clearly evident in the boom period.16  Similarly, as shown in panel 5D, California housing 
portfolio integration and diversification vary inversely to one another.  In the decade of the 
2000s, the simple correlation coefficient between those series increased to -.52 from -.48 
for the full 1994 – 2010 timeframe. 
In sum, analysis of simulated investment portfolios indicates sizable upward adjustment 
to measured risk in the context of the pronounced increase in portfolio integration over the 
2000s housing boom.  The increases in portfolio risk reflect sharp declines in opportunities 
for investment diversification.  In short, the above findings suggest the limits of geographic 
diversification as a strategy for portfolio risk mitigation.      
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the efficacy of geographic diversification as a strategy of risk 
mitigation among investors and insurers of housing, mortgages, and mortgage-related 
derivatives.  In so doing, it applies data from 384 US MSAs to characterize integration, 
spatial correlation, and contagion among metropolitan U.S. housing markets.  Results of 
those analyses are then applied to comprise and assess the risk of alternative housing 
investment portfolios. 
Results of estimation of a multi-factor model reveal a highly integrated set of US 
metropolitan housing markets.  Further, integration levels trended up markedly during the 
boom period of the 2000s, especially in California.  California MSAs also experienced 
elevated jumps in returns as well as high levels of return and jump return correlations.  
Substantial short-term contagion also was prevalent in the San Francisco area, whereas 
Southern California house returns move largely in lock step.  Findings indicate that the 
                                                             
16
 The simple correlation between portfolio integration and risk for California MSAs was approximately .48 
in both the full time-series and the decade of the 2000s. 
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susceptibility of MSA markets to national economic and policy shocks trended up over time 
and was especially evident in the decade of the 2000s.  Simulation of alternative housing 
investment portfolios shows reduced diversification potential and increased credit risk in 
the wake of estimated increases in metropolitan housing market integration.   
Research findings provide new insights regarding the synchronous non-performance of 
geographically-disparate MBS investments during the late 2000s.  Further, given the high 
levels of systemic risk evidenced in the data, results suggest that losses to private mortgage 
insurers could reach unsustainable levels in a severe housing downturn.  Research findings 
suggest an alternative mechanism may be required to assure liquidity and financial stability 
during a period of catastrophic housing risk.         
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Figure 1:  US and California House Price Indices 
 
 
Notes: The chart depicts the time series of US national and California index levels (1975: Q1 
- 2010:Q1) based on repeat sales house price indexes from the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA).  The prices are normalized to 100 in 1980:Q1. 
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Figure 2:  Housing Return Integration Trends 
Panel A: Average R-squares for US MSAs and California MSAs 
 
 
Panel B: Average R-squares for US MSA Time Cohorts 
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Panel C: Average R-squares for California Inland and Coastal MSAs 
 
Notes: The level of integration is measured by the R-squares from the multi-factor housing 
returns model fitted for the full sample of MSAs using a 20-quarter moving window.  See 
Appendix Table 1 for details on the factors utilized in model estimation.  Average levels of 
integration are presented for 1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1 for 384 US MSAs and for 28 California 
MSAs.  Average levels of integration are presented for time cohorts based on when the MSA 
entered the database and had sufficient time series to execute the moving window 
regression.  The cohorts begin at 1983: Q4 (cohort 1), 1989:Q2 (cohort 2) and 1992:Q1 
(cohort 3).  Average levels of integration are also presented for California Interior MSAs and 
California Coast MSAs. California Coastal MSAs include Los Angeles, Oakland, Oxnard, San 
Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, San Luis Obispo, Santa Ana, Santa Barbara and Santa Cruz 
with the remainder of the 28 MSAs categorized as California Inland MSAs. 
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Figure 3:  Factor Model Betas 
 
Panel A: Interest Rate Factor for US MSAs and California MSAs 
 
 
Panel B: Unemployment Factor for US MSAs and California MSAs 
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Panel C: Income Factor for US MSAs and California MSAs 
 
 
Notes: The factor betas are from the multi-factor housing returns model fitted for the full 
sample of MSAs using a 20-quarter moving window. Factors betas are given for interest 
rates (Fed Funds rate), unemployment (unemployment rate) and income (personal 
income).  Factor betas are presented for 1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1 for 384 US MSAs and for 28 
California MSAs.   
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Figure 4:  US and California LM Jump Statistics 
Panel A: Big LM House Price Return Jumps Proportion [% |LM| > 2] for US 
MSAs by Quarter  
 
 
Panel B: Big LM House Price Return Jumps Proportion [% |LM| > 2] 
for Coastal and Inland California MSAs by Quarter 
 
 
Notes: The Lee and Mykland (2008) (LM) jump measure is computed from quarterly 
observations for each of the 384 MSAs.   Plots are given for the US National, and for inland 
and coast California MSAs.  The plots are from 1983:Q4 and show the percentage of LM 
statistic that exceed 2.0.   The percentage classified as a jump quarter is when the absolute 
value of the LM statistic exceeds the 10% level for a unit normal (1.65).   
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Figure 5:  Housing Return Integration, Portfolio Risk and Diversification  
 
Panel A: Integration and Porfolio Risk for US MSAs  
 
Panel B: Integration and Diversification for US MSAs  
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Panel C: Integration and Porfolio Risk for CA MSAs  
 
Panel D: Integration and Diversification for CA MSAs  
 
Notes: The level of integration is measured by the R-squares from the multi-factor housing 
returns model fitted for the full sample of MSAs using a 20-quarter moving window.  See 
Appendix Table 1 for details on the factors utilized in model estimation.  Portfolio risk is 
measured using the standard deviation of housing returns for a 20-quarter moving window.  
The portfolio is constructed for an equally weighted grouping assuming each portfolio’s 
MSAs are in the database.  Diversification measures the degree of risk mitigation of the 
portfolio relative to the average risk of the MSAs.  Values are presented for 28 California 
MSAs for 1994:Q4 – 2010:Q1 and for 102 US MSAs for 1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1. 
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Table 1 
Summary Integration Measures for All MSAs 
 
 
Mean Sigma 
Final  
R-Square 
Change in 
R-Square 
 
R-Square 
Trend  T-
stat 
Mean 0.988 2.450 0.822 0.093 1.222 
Std Dev 0.259 0.890 0.118 0.187 2.879 
Min/Quintile 1 0.430 0.980 0.349 -0.616 -7.246 
Quintile 2 0.784 1.744 0.738 -0.046 -1.167 
Quintile 3 0.890 2.144 0.817 0.053 0.501 
Quintile 4 0.998 2.545 0.864 0.120 2.035 
Quintile 5 1.185 2.958 0.930 0.236 3.436 
Max 1.892 9.258 0.993 0.695 10.469 
 
Summary details for 5 integration characteristics (Mean, Sigma, Final R-square, Change in R-
square, and R-Square Trend T-stat) are presented for the 384 MSAs.  Mean is the average 
quarterly house price return.  We compute house price returns for each MSA in our sample as 
the log quarterly difference in its FHFA repeat home sales price index.  Sigma is the standard 
deviation of returns.  We use R-Squares as the measure of integration and these are applied to 
obtain R-square trend t-statistics. R-squares are obtained from fitting MSA returns to the factors 
described in Appendix Table 1.  The time trend t-statistics are estimated by regressing the R-
squares for each MSA on a simple linear time trend for all available quarters of data.  The final R-
squares pertain to 2010:Q1 for all 384 US MSAs.  The change in R-squares refers to the 
difference between estimates for 2010:Q1 and 1983:Q4 for each MSA.  Summary details report 
the time-series cross-sectional summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum/quintile 
1, quintile 2, quintile 3, quintile 4, quintile 5 and maximum) of the characteristics. The minimum 
values of each quintile are presented.  
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Table 2 
Summary Integration Measures for California MSAs 
 
MSA Mean 
US 
Rank 
Mean 
CA 
Rank 
Mean 
Sigma 
US Rank 
Sigma 
CA 
Rank 
Sigma 
Final 
R-Square 
Change in 
R-Square 
Trend 
t-stat 
US 
Rank 
Trend 
t-stat 
CA Rank 
Trend 
t-stat 
Bakersfield 0.864 136 4 3.197 330 16 0.898 0.166 4.228 335 26 
Chico 1.066 273 11 3.077 321 13 0.832 0.169 -0.844 87 7 
El Centro 0.607 11 1 4.240 370 27 0.912 0.114 2.365 258 18 
Fresno 1.075 276 12 3.198 331 17 0.833 -0.004 2.174 241 16 
Hanford 0.909 172 8 3.098 324 15 0.619 0.226 4.120 331 25 
Los Angeles 1.736 380 26 2.839 286 5 0.558 -0.339 2.172 239 15 
Madera 0.879 146 6 3.548 351 23 0.826 -0.121 8.208 380 28 
Merced 0.790 84 2 4.674 376 28 0.889 0.111 2.937 282 20 
Modesto 1.005 236 9 4.006 364 26 0.820 0.168 2.994 286 22 
Napa 1.424 358 18 2.989 312 9 0.838 0.158 3.463 310 24 
Oakland 1.699 378 25 2.638 250 2 0.577 -0.115 0.744 167 12 
Oxnard 1.635 374 23 2.991 313 10 0.768 0.099 2.353 255 17 
Redding 0.879 148 7 3.063 319 12 0.947 0.388 -1.395 68 5 
Riverside 1.296 332 14 3.438 343 21 0.713 0.177 -1.260 74 6 
Sacramento 1.354 345 17 2.894 299 8 0.649 -0.176 2.980 284 21 
Salinas 1.336 340 16 3.570 354 24 0.568 0.044 1.866 222 14 
San Diego 1.541 369 20 3.013 314 11 0.868 -0.114 0.253 141 10 
San 
Francisco 
1.892 384 28 2.540 229 1 0.638 -0.143 -2.069 50 3 
San Jose 1.877 383 27 2.789 274 4 0.759 0.123 -2.379 42 1 
San Luis 
Obispo 
1.303 334 
15 
3.326 337 
19 
0.637 -0.134 -0.826 88 
8 
Santa Ana 1.674 376 24 2.718 265 3 0.626 0.051 -1.713 58 4 
Santa 
Barbara 
1.470 364 
19 
2.879 295 
7 
0.779 0.090 0.256 142 
11 
Santa Cruz 1.599 373 22 3.093 323 14 0.657 0.065 2.422 262 19 
Santa Rosa 1.590 371 21 2.855 291 6 0.678 0.251 0.990 182 13 
Stockton 1.050 266 10 3.696 359 25 0.669 0.238 -0.537 108 9 
Vallejo 1.133 293 13 3.419 342 20 0.796 0.074 -2.146 47 2 
 41 
Visalia 0.872 142 5 3.244 334 18 0.828 -0.013 3.380 303 23 
Yuba City 0.833 113 3 3.448 345 22 0.579 0.030 5.775 361 27 
 Mean   Sigma   
Final 
R-Square 
Change in 
R-Square 
Trend 
t-stat 
 
 
 
Mean 1.264 
  
3.231 
  
0.741 0.057 1.447 
  
Std Dev 0.368 
  
0.485 
  
0.118 0.158 2.590 
  
Min 0.607 
  
2.540 
  
0.558 -0.339 -2.379 
  
Max 1.892 
  
4.674 
  
0.947 0.388 8.208 
  
 
 
Notes: Details for 3 integration characteristics (Mean, Sigma and R-Square Trend t-stat) are 
presented for all 28 California MSAs.  Mean is the average quarterly house price return.  We 
compute house price returns for each MSA in our sample as the log quarterly difference in 
its FHFA repeat home sales price index.  Sigma is the standard deviation of returns.  R-
Squares are the estimates of integration and are used to obtain R-Square trend t-statistics.  
R-squares are obtained from fitting MSA returns to the factor model described in Appendix 
Table 1.  The time trend t-statistics are estimated by regressing the R-squares for each MSA 
on a simple linear time trend for all available quarters of data.  The final R-Squares pertain 
to 2010:Q1 for all 28 California MSAs.  The change in R-Squares refers to the difference 
between estimates for 2010:Q1 and 1983:Q4 for each MSA.  Each characteristic is ranked 
from lowest to highest in comparison both to all 384 US MSAs and all 28 California MSAs.   
The last four rows provide the time-series cross-sectional summary statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of the characteristics with reference to all CA 
MSAs.  
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Table 3—MSA House Price Return and Jump Correlations 
 
Panel A: Return Correlations 
Full sample 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
73536 0.201 0.182 299.735 0.946 -0.639 
Sample of correlations with T-statistic > 2 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
33460 0.354 0.125 517.703 0.946 0.173 
Sample of correlations with T-statistic > 3 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
18126 0.435 0.116 505.922 0.946 0.258 
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Table 3—MSA House Price Return and Jump Correlations 
 
Panel B: Jump Correlations 
Full sample 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
49742 0.047 0.194 53.528 1.000 -0.924 
Sample of jump correlations with T-statistic > 2 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
8770 0.375 0.148 236.908 1.000 0.173 
Sample of jump correlations with T-statistic > 3 
N Mean Sigma T-Stat Maximum Minimum 
5405 0.455 0.135 247.201 1.000 0.259 
 
Notes:  Notes: Panel A shows the house price return correlations.  Correlation coefficients 
are computed from quarterly returns for all pairs of 384 MSAs (total sample N = 73536).  
Sigma is the cross-coefficient standard deviation.  T is the T-statistic that tests for cross-
coefficient independence.  Panel B shows the jump correlations.  Correlation coefficients are 
computed from quarterly returns for Lee and Mykland's (2008) (LM) jump measure. Sigma is 
the cross-coefficient standard deviation.  T is the T-statistic that tests for cross-coefficient 
independence. 
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Table 4 
Contemporaneous and Lagged MSA House Price Return and Jump Correlations  
by Geographical Cohort 
 
Panel A: Return Correlations 
  
  
Contemporaneous correlation Lead correlation 
N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation 
Division 1 190 37 19.474 0.304 400 34 8.500 0.182 
Division 2 595 83 13.950 0.314 1225 88 7.184 0.222 
Division 3 496 14 2.823 0.211 1024 6 0.586 0.100 
Division 4 903 29 3.212 0.180 1849 19 1.028 0.091 
Division 5 1953 129 6.605 0.268 3969 49 1.235 0.148 
Division 6 2628 237 9.018 0.251 5329 295 5.536 0.171 
Division 7 703 62 8.819 0.237 1444 62 4.294 0.154 
Division 8 561 100 17.825 0.317 1156 104 8.997 0.213 
Division 9 153 114 74.510 0.629 324 193 59.568 0.501 
CA 378 349 92.328 0.656 784 596 76.020 0.565 
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Table 4 
Contemporaneous and Lagged MSA House Price Return and Jump Correlations  
by Geographical Cohort 
Panel B: Jump (LM) Correlations 
  
  
Contemporaneous correlation Lead correlation 
N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation N 
Number 
Significant 
Percentage 
Significant 
Mean 
Correlation 
Division 1 190 9 4.737 0.028 321 20 6.231 -0.029 
Division 2 595 19 3.193 0.021 791 31 3.919 0.035 
Division 3 496 5 1.008 0.006 552 23 4.167 0.035 
Division 4 903 26 2.879 0.017 1124 60 5.338 0.025 
Division 5 1953 60 3.072 0.018 2479 111 4.478 0.037 
Division 6 2628 67 2.549 0.017 3772 84 2.227 0.034 
Division 7 703 33 4.694 0.033 1068 17 1.592 0.012 
Division 8 561 15 2.674 0.016 770 36 4.675 0.041 
Division 9 153 13 8.497 0.047 252 13 5.159 0.095 
CA 378 130 34.392 0.224 705 49 6.950 0.116 
 
Notes: Panel A presents the return correlations including both contemporaneous and lead 
(one quarter ahead) correlations.  Correlation coefficients are computed from quarterly 
returns for each geographical division where N is the sample size.  The number and 
proportion of significant correlations with a t-statistic greater than 5 are reported.  The 
mean correlation is also given. Panel B presents the jump correlations including both 
contemporaneous and lead (one quarter ahead) correlations.  Correlation coefficients are 
computed from quarterly returns for Lee and Mykland's (2008) (LM) jump measure for 
each geographical division where N is the sample size.   The number and proportion of 
significant correlations with a t-statistic greater than 5 are reported.  The mean correlation 
is also given.  The geographical divisions are based on the 9 US census divisions.  However 
the definition of division 1 is not standard, in that we remove California from census 
division 1 and report it separately in a cohort by itself (CA). The states in the 9 census 
divisions are: Division 1 (AK HI OR WA), Division 2 (AZ CO ID MT NM NV UT WY), Division 3 
(IA KS MN MO ND NE SD), Division 4 (AR LA OK TX), Division 5 (IL IN MI OH WI), Division 6 
(AL KY MS TN), Division 7 (DC DE FL GA MD NC SC VA WV), Division 8 (NJ NY PA) and 
Division 9 (CT MA ME NH RI VT).    
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Table 5—Housing Return Contagion Regressions for California MSAs 
 
Panel A: Explanatory MSA - Los Angeles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  N Constant Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 R-Squares 
Bakersfield 130 -0.460 0.600 0.350 -0.210 0.120 0.516 
  
 
(-2.010) (4.360) (2.050) (-1.220) (0.880) 
 
Fresno 131 -0.280 0.600 0.290 -0.230 0.190 0.509 
  
 
(-1.200) (4.320) (1.730) (-1.340) (1.400) 
 
Oxnard 135 0.100 1.070 0.070 -0.120 -0.090 0.867 
  
 
(0.850) (16.420) (0.890) (-1.430) (-1.300) 
 
Riverside 135 -0.540 0.950 0.110 0.100 -0.060 0.788 
  
 
(-3.300) (10.100) (0.970) (0.810) (-0.640) 
 
San Diego 136 0.190 0.900 -0.190 0.030 0.060 0.564 
  
 
(0.940) (7.610) (-1.270) (0.200) (0.510) 
 
Santa Ana 136 0.100 0.900 0.020 0.010 -0.010 0.895 
  
 
(1.040) (17.170) (0.250) (0.140) (-0.270) 
 
Santa 
Barbara 
129 0.220 0.890 -0.080 0.070 -0.050 0.649 
  
 
(1.240) (8.390) (-0.590) (0.550) (-0.450) 
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Panel B: Explanatory MSA - San Francisco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  N Constant Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 R-Squares 
Merced 117 -1.130 0.340 0.670 0.190 -0.050 0.285 
  
 
(-2.430) (1.190) (2.100) (0.690) (-0.210) 
 
Modesto 131 -0.950 -0.020 0.650 0.410 0.050 0.380 
  
 
(-2.640) (-0.130) (3.480) (2.160) (0.290) 
 
Napa 125 -0.100 0.370 0.130 0.400 0.010 0.439 
  
 
(-0.380) (2.820) (0.910) (2.760) (0.050) 
 
Oakland 135 -0.290 0.670 0.140 0.110 0.120 0.821 
  
 
(-2.280) (11.330) (2.170) (1.710) (2.090) 
 
Sacramento 134 -0.260 0.400 0.290 -0.070 0.260 0.447 
  
 
(-1.050) (3.500) (2.310) (-0.590) (2.240) 
 
Salinas 129 -0.440 0.610 0.480 -0.260 0.220 0.427 
  
 
(-1.430) (3.880) (2.880) (-1.530) (1.480) 
 
San Jose 135 -0.170 0.710 0.310 0.030 0.040 0.831 
  
 
(-1.350) (11.750) (4.620) (0.380) (0.730) 
 
Santa Cruz 127 -0.030 0.360 0.380 0.300 -0.070 0.473 
  
 
(-0.130) (2.780) (2.610) (2.060) (-0.520) 
 
Santa Rosa 133 -0.230 0.440 0.410 0.070 0.090 0.623 
  
 
(-1.160) (4.710) (3.930) (0.680) (0.940) 
 
Stockton 131 -0.900 0.590 0.250 0.100 0.180 0.423 
  
 
(-2.840) (3.790) (1.510) (0.570) (1.190) 
 
Vallejo 127 -0.630 0.550 0.050 0.520 -0.070 0.465 
  
 
(-2.240) (3.790) (0.310) (3.240) (-0.490) 
 
 48 
Panel C: Explanatory MSA - Santa Barbara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Regression results for a selection of California MSAs on contemporaneous and lagged 
returns (3 lags) of large coastal California MSAs.  The three large coastal leading cities used 
in the regressions are Los Angeles (Panel A), San Francesco (Panel B) and Santa Barbara 
(Panel C).  N is the number of quarters in each regression.  Regression coefficients and t-
statistics in parentheses are given. R-squares of each regression are also reported.  Results 
for some MSAs required a Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment for error term serial correlation.  
Durbin-Watson statistics for all presented MSA regressions allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis of first order serial correlation.   
  
Oxnard 126 0.040 0.550 0.270 0.130 -0.020 0.673 
   (0.250) (7.400) (3.700) (1.750) (-0.250)  
San Luis 
Obispo 
126 0.180 0.230 0.130 0.190 0.260 0.379 
  
 
(0.680) (2.060) (1.210) (1.750) (2.280) 
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Table 6— Housing Return Contagion Regressions Across Booms and Busts for 
California MSAs 
Panel A: Explanatory MSA - Los Angeles 
 
 
  N Constant Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 
R-
Square 
Bakersfield 130 -0.35 0.60 0.26 -0.14 0.10 0.08 2.27 -2.67 1.03 0.523 
   
(-1.34) (3.87) (1.49) (-.81) (0.68) (0.07) (1.64) (-2.13) (1.13) 
 
Fresno 121 0.07 0.58 -0.19 0.05 0.29 0.49 -0.98 -0.41 0.030 0.294 
   
(0.22) (3.09) (-0.93) (0.22) (1.58) (0.36) (-0.58) (-0.25) (0.03) 
 
Oxnard 131 -0.37 0.62 0.30 -0.25 0.21 -1.16 -0.25 1.82 -1.31 0.518 
   
(-1.47) (4.06) (1.76) (-1.43) (1.47) (-1.03) (-0.19) (1.51) (-1.43) 
 
Riverside 135 0.14 1.01 0.10 -0.14 -0.050 0.26 0.010 0.13 -0.96 0.882 
   
(1.210) (15.55) (1.32) (-1.78) (-0.80) (0.67) (0.02) (0.25) (-2.34) 
 
San Diego 135 -0.50 0.96 0.110 0.10 -0.070 -0.10 0.94 -0.91 0.13 0.786 
   
(-2.80) (9.44) (0.91) (0.83) (-0.68) (-0.16) (1.18) (-1.09) (0.20) 
 
Santa Ana 136 0.25 0.82 -0.15 -0.02 0.13 1.49 -2.28 1.64 -1.46 0.594 
   
(1.19) (7.04) (-1.03) (-0.11) (1.11) (2.24) (-2.46) (1.83) (-2.28) 
 
Santa 
Barbara 
136 0.13 0.87 0.030 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.34 -0.31 -0.51 0.904 
   
(1.40) (16.83) (0.50) (-0.01) (0.020) (0.38) (0.84) (-0.77) (-1.81) 
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Panel B: Explanatory MSA - San Francisco 
 
  N Constant Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 
R-
Square 
Merced 117 -0.92 0.36 0.72 -0.04 0.10 0.88 0.81 2.46 -2.35 0.292 
   
(-1.88) (1.18) (1.90) (-0.10) (0.34) (0.41) (0.31) (0.96) (-1.19) 
 
Modesto 131 -0.84 -0.01 0.67 0.39 0.06 0.15 1.51 0.51 -1.33 0.387 
   
(-2.30) (-0.08) (3.31) (1.85) (0.33) (0.13) (1.27) (0.39) (-1.17) 
 
Napa 125 -0.10 0.55 -0.18 0.46 0.09 -2.05 3.18 -0.33 -1.18 0.458 
   
(-0.39) (3.61) (-0.92) (2.29) (0.56) (-2.00) (2.46) (-0.24) (-1.10) 
 
Oakland 135 -0.29 0.67 0.14 0.12 0.11 -0.40 0.53 0.07 -0.21 0.821 
   
(-2.23) (10.98) (2.04) (1.80) (1.84) (-1.23) (1.53) (0.17) (-0.56) 
 
Sacramento 129 -0.31 0.56 0.53 -0.36 0.30 1.04 0.24 0.96 -2.06 0.432 
   
(-0.97) (3.11) (2.81) (-1.85) (1.88) (0.86) (0.20) (0.72) (-2.02) 
 
Salinas 135 -0.22 0.71 0.30 0.04 0.04 -0.34 -0.34 0.060 0.42 0.831 
   
(-1.66) (11.36) (4.34) (0.52) (0.60) (-1.02) -(0.96) (0.15) (1.12) 
 
San Jose 127 -0.15 0.54 0.19 0.29 -0.03 -2.51 1.74 0.41 -0.21 0.483 
   
(-0.56) (3.53) (0.99) (1.52) (-0.19) (-2.43) (1.36) (0.31) (-0.20) 
 
Santa Cruz 133 -0.26 0.42 0.39 0.07 0.10 -1.20 0.77 0.69 -0.85 0.646 
   
(-1.31) (4.48) (3.74) (0.64) (1.05) (-2.27) (1.28) (1.12) (-1.47) 
 
Santa Rosa 131 -0.67 0.46 0.43 -0.04 0.25 3.29 -1.25 0.74 -1.56 0.457 
   
(-2.13) (2.88) (2.43) (-0.21) (1.58) (3.27) (-1.21) (0.64) (-1.58) 
 
Stockton 127 -0.59 0.54 0.12 0.37 0.02 0.30 -0.33 1.58 -1.07 0.456 
   
(-1.97) (3.14) (0.54) (1.70) (0.13) (0.26) (-0.23) (1.06) (-0.90) 
 
Vallejo 117 -0.92 0.36 0.72 -0.04 0.10 0.88 0.81 2.46 -2.35 0.292 
   
(-1.88) (1.18) (1.90) (-0.10) (0.34) (0.41) (0.31) (0.96) (-1.19) 
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Panel C: Explanatory MSA - Santa Barbara 
 
 
  N Constant Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag0 Lag1 Lag2 Lag3   
Oxnard 126 0.16 0.55 0.22 0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.80 0.31 -0.59 0.671 
   
(0.79) (5.71) (2.70) (1.27) (0.11) (-0.09) (1.29) (0.53) (-0.93) 
 
San Luis 
Obispo 
126 -0.01 0.30 0.16 0.15 0.25 -1.19 -0.45 0.86 0.18 0.371 
   
(-0.04) (2.03) (1.29) (1.17) (1.68) (-1.06) (-0.47) (0.95) (0.19) 
 
 
Notes: Regression results for a selection of California MSAs on contemporaneous and lagged 
returns (3 lags) of large coastal California MSAs.  In addition the regressions contain four 
more variables, each one being an interaction between the explanatory city's return 
(including 3 lags) and a contemporaneous residual from a time trend fit of the log of the 
large coastal city’s house price index.   The three large coastal leading cities used in the 
regressions are Los Angeles (Panel A), San Francesco (Panel B) and Santa Barbara (Panel C).  
N is the number of quarters in each regression.  Regression coefficients and t-statistics in 
parentheses are given. R-squares of each regression are also reported.  Results for some 
MSAs required a Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment for error term serial correlation.  Durbin-
Watson statistics for all presented MSA regressions allow us to reject the null hypothesis of 
first order serial correlation.   
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Appendix Table 1 
Factor Model Data and Specification 
 
Data Data Defined 
MSA HP log percent change in MSA house price index 
CNP16OV log percent change civilian non-institutional population 
CPILFESL log percent change in CPI 
FEDFUNDS log Fed Funds Rate 
GS10 log 10-year constant maturity Treasury 
INDPRO log percent change in Industrial Production Index 
PAYEMS log percent change in US payroll employment 
PERMIT1 log single-family building permits 
PPIITM log percent change PPI materials prices 
UMCSENT log University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index 
UNRATE log unemployment rate 
SP500 log percent change in S&P 500 
INCOME log personal income 
 
Notes: MSA level data are quarterly and the start of the database is 1975 quarter 1 and the end 
is 2010 quarter 1. The number of MSAs in the database increases over time beginning with 2 in 
1975 and reaches 380 by 1993.  At the end of the sample there are 384 MSAs. All factor data are 
quarterly from 1975:Q1 – 2010:Q1 with the exception of UMCSENT which is available since 1977 
quarter 4.  The MSA house price data is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  
MSA house price returns are computed as the log quarterly difference in the MSA repeat home 
sales price index.  Data for the factors are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) except the SP500 (Datastream) and INCOME (US Dept of 
Commerce National Income and Product Accounts).   
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Appendix Table 2 
Integration Details for All MSAs 
 
MSA State Mean 
Rank 
Mean 
Quintile 
Mean 
Sigma 
Rank 
Sigma 
Quintile 
Sigma 
Final 
R-Square 
Change in 
R-Square 
Trend 
t-stat 
Rank 
Trend 
t-stat 
Quintile 
Trend 
t-stat 
Abilene TX 0.615 16 1 3.115 325 5 0.962 0.274 -0.379 111 2 
Akron OH 0.957 200 3 1.688 68 1 0.897 0.049 -1.964 52 1 
Albany GA 0.699 36 1 2.040 137 2 0.846 0.364 -1.417 32 1 
Albany NY 1.337 341 5 2.590 241 4 0.871 0.134 -2.847 67 1 
Albuquerque NM 1.152 298 4 1.961 116 2 0.938 0.062 0.783 171 3 
Alexandria LA 0.790 83 2 2.186 160 3 0.954 0.102 7.057 373 5 
Allentown PA 1.050 264 4 3.357 340 5 0.952 0.304 -1.944 53 1 
Altoona PA 1.027 252 4 2.526 225 3 0.956 0.058 -2.983 31 1 
Amarillo TX 0.779 73 1 2.894 298 4 0.734 -0.012 0.174 136 2 
Ames IA 0.952 195 3 1.380 26 1 0.555 0.111 -3.058 29 1 
Anchorage AK 0.728 51 1 3.811 360 5 0.777 -0.047 2.316 249 4 
Anderson SC 0.829 110 2 2.131 41 1 0.851 0.197 1.453 203 3 
Anderson IN 0.872 140 2 1.513 150 2 0.944 0.576 6.308 366 5 
Ann Arbor MI 0.977 213 3 2.351 189 3 0.969 0.202 1.343 196 3 
Anniston AL 0.910 173 3 1.983 121 2 0.762 0.181 0.132 133 2 
Appleton WI 0.843 122 2 1.094 5 1 0.766 0.095 1.781 219 3 
Asheville NC 1.265 325 5 1.459 32 1 0.882 0.447 5.743 360 5 
Athens GA 0.904 165 3 1.255 12 1 0.814 -0.104 -2.158 46 1 
Atlanta GA 1.010 241 4 1.494 39 1 0.925 0.061 -1.147 79 1 
Atlantic City NJ 1.176 304 4 2.407 203 3 0.954 0.356 1.468 204 3 
Auburn AL 0.858 131 2 2.223 167 3 0.965 0.574 6.963 372 5 
Augusta GA 0.876 143 2 3.216 332 5 0.967 0.383 0.653 159 3 
Austin TX 1.220 314 5 3.056 318 5 0.776 0.254 1.595 210 3 
Bakersfield CA 0.864 136 2 3.197 330 5 0.898 0.166 4.228 335 5 
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Baltimore MD 1.364 349 5 1.846 103 2 0.750 0.035 2.692 272 4 
Bangor ME 0.721 46 1 2.700 261 4 0.964 0.440 3.558 316 5 
Barnstable 
Town 
MA 1.390 354 5 2.540 227 3 0.836 0.252 2.816 276 4 
Baton Rouge LA 0.915 177 3 1.704 70 1 0.786 -0.095 2.360 257 4 
Battle Creek MI 0.897 159 3 2.136 151 2 0.855 0.342 2.565 269 4 
Bay City MI 0.899 161 3 2.513 221 3 0.860 0.243 1.847 221 3 
Beaumont TX 0.729 52 1 2.435 209 3 0.853 0.028 -1.434 66 1 
Bellingham WA 1.337 342 5 2.565 235 4 0.743 -0.080 -3.500 20 1 
Bend OR 1.367 350 5 3.076 320 5 0.797 0.022 0.986 181 3 
Bethesda MD 1.438 361 5 2.232 168 3 0.760 -0.038 -0.973 83 2 
Billings MT 1.006 238 4 2.501 219 3 0.768 0.142 -0.485 109 2 
Binghamton NY 0.809 101 2 2.516 223 3 0.739 0.102 -2.385 41 1 
Birmingham AL 0.954 197 3 2.397 201 3 0.975 0.450 0.435 153 2 
Bismarck ND 0.967 205 3 1.349 21 1 0.666 -0.177 -6.109 2 1 
Blacksburg VA 0.996 227 3 1.519 42 1 0.716 -0.081 -1.746 57 1 
Bloomington IN 1.019 81 2 1.765 6 1 0.815 0.141 5.729 209 3 
Bloomington IL 0.788 247 4 1.108 82 2 0.787 0.043 1.593 359 5 
Boise City ID 0.849 126 2 3.337 338 5 0.896 -0.039 3.439 308 5 
Boston MA 1.738 381 5 2.578 238 4 0.880 0.022 2.660 270 4 
Boulder CO 1.325 339 5 2.238 170 3 0.597 -0.372 -0.683 94 2 
Bowling Green KY 0.840 117 2 1.630 59 1 0.898 0.278 -4.927 7 1 
Bremerton WA 1.187 308 5 2.817 280 4 0.914 0.039 -2.616 37 1 
Bridgeport CT 1.428 360 5 2.703 262 4 0.857 0.098 1.992 227 3 
Brownsville TX 0.750 55 1 2.642 251 4 0.718 -0.278 -4.158 11 1 
Brunswick GA 1.162 302 4 1.966 118 2 0.817 -0.096 0.653 160 3 
Buffalo NY 1.050 265 4 2.201 162 3 0.618 -0.234 3.434 307 5 
Burlington NC 0.792 85 2 1.541 46 1 0.838 0.086 0.302 145 2 
Burlington VT 1.232 317 5 1.569 49 1 0.749 0.022 1.701 214 3 
Cambridge MA 1.712 379 5 2.386 196 3 0.671 -0.261 0.720 165 3 
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Camden NJ 1.358 348 5 2.466 214 3 0.800 0.204 3.116 293 4 
Canton OH 0.834 114 2 2.285 178 3 0.766 -0.102 -3.296 24 1 
Cape Coral FL 0.655 28 1 3.659 358 5 0.738 0.019 2.754 274 4 
Cape Girardeau MO 0.807 99 2 2.030 134 2 0.856 0.040 -3.712 14 1 
Carson City NV 0.967 206 3 2.827 283 4 0.916 0.078 1.869 223 3 
Casper WY 0.727 49 1 4.553 375 5 0.835 0.198 0.360 149 2 
Cedar Rapids IA 0.842 119 2 2.035 136 2 0.757 -0.119 3.680 320 5 
Champaign IL 0.833 112 2 1.279 14 1 0.897 0.397 5.474 354 5 
Charleston WV 0.755 60 1 1.800 90 2 0.865 0.378 0.954 178 3 
Charleston SC 1.254 322 5 5.619 381 5 0.957 0.189 7.573 377 5 
Charlotte NC 1.169 303 4 1.762 80 2 0.935 0.011 2.510 267 4 
Charlottesville VA 1.231 316 5 2.136 152 2 0.700 -0.044 -3.595 19 1 
Chattanooga TN 1.029 253 4 2.635 249 4 0.934 0.462 -2.258 44 1 
Cheyenne WY 0.992 222 3 2.794 275 4 0.843 0.297 2.197 245 4 
Chicago IL 1.250 320 5 1.948 114 2 0.913 0.038 3.457 309 5 
Chico CA 1.066 273 4 3.077 321 5 0.832 0.169 -0.844 87 2 
Cincinnati OH 0.997 228 3 1.206 10 1 0.953 0.695 3.113 292 4 
Clarksville TN 0.950 191 3 1.308 17 1 0.845 0.311 0.402 151 2 
Cleveland TN 0.983 203 3 1.900 109 2 0.898 0.084 -1.074 80 2 
Cleveland OH 0.964 216 3 2.009 131 2 0.885 0.095 2.333 251 4 
Coeur d'Alene ID 1.298 333 5 2.756 271 4 0.813 -0.110 3.304 301 4 
College Station TX 0.632 21 1 1.806 93 2 0.448 -0.022 0.302 144 2 
Colorado 
Springs 
CO 1.046 261 4 2.590 242 4 0.946 -0.004 -0.257 115 2 
Columbia SC 0.765 68 1 1.413 30 1 0.764 0.121 -1.292 72 1 
Columbia MO 0.994 223 3 1.669 65 1 0.957 0.320 1.381 199 3 
Columbus OH 0.817 103 2 1.258 11 1 0.845 0.072 1.199 113 2 
Columbus GA 0.943 186 3 1.254 13 1 0.915 0.283 2.103 188 3 
Columbus IN 0.995 225 3 1.491 38 1 0.960 0.090 -0.331 236 4 
Corpus Christi TX 0.688 35 1 3.129 327 5 0.564 -0.371 -1.678 60 1 
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Corvallis OR 1.305 335 5 2.222 166 3 0.913 0.190 2.860 278 4 
Crestview FL 0.940 184 3 3.041 317 5 0.690 -0.238 4.394 337 5 
Cumberland MD 1.029 254 4 3.039 316 5 0.576 0.042 2.087 234 4 
Dallas TX 1.048 263 4 2.596 243 4 0.812 0.167 -0.779 90 2 
Dalton GA 0.836 116 2 2.416 206 3 0.760 0.085 -2.072 49 1 
Danville IL 0.730 53 1 2.446 200 3 0.931 0.304 4.740 27 1 
Danville VA 0.787 80 2 2.393 211 3 0.774 -0.085 -3.151 346 5 
Davenport IA 0.687 34 1 2.581 240 4 0.812 -0.047 0.145 134 2 
Dayton OH 0.903 164 3 2.119 148 2 0.943 0.195 2.107 237 4 
Decatur AL 0.664 30 1 1.332 18 1 0.533 -0.387 -7.246 1 1 
Decatur IL 0.716 42 1 1.843 102 2 0.953 0.081 -2.301 43 1 
Deltona FL 1.035 257 4 5.225 379 5 0.819 0.155 0.347 147 2 
Denver CO 1.345 344 5 1.824 98 2 0.948 0.389 6.511 369 5 
Des Moines IA 0.876 144 2 2.984 311 5 0.848 0.113 2.340 252 4 
Detroit MI 0.927 180 3 2.568 237 4 0.866 0.049 2.476 266 4 
Dothan AL 0.802 94 2 1.990 125 2 0.775 0.220 2.475 265 4 
Dover DE 0.940 185 3 2.274 176 3 0.712 -0.004 4.168 332 5 
Dubuque IA 1.031 255 4 1.611 56 1 0.790 -0.038 -2.245 45 1 
Duluth MN 1.320 337 5 1.607 53 1 0.858 0.104 1.756 216 3 
Durham NC 0.985 218 3 2.376 194 3 0.976 0.111 0.551 158 3 
Eau Claire WI 1.061 269 4 1.820 97 2 0.945 0.163 3.184 297 4 
Edison NJ 1.489 368 5 2.335 187 3 0.753 0.013 -0.223 117 2 
El Centro CA 0.607 11 1 4.240 370 5 0.912 0.114 2.365 258 4 
El Paso TX 0.706 39 1 2.167 158 3 0.937 0.300 -0.949 85 2 
Elizabethtown KY 0.977 214 3 1.741 76 1 0.876 0.212 6.697 370 5 
Elkhart IN 0.760 64 1 1.600 52 1 0.637 -0.096 -5.684 3 1 
Elmira NY 0.681 33 1 2.876 294 4 0.417 -0.348 -3.711 15 1 
Erie PA 0.909 171 3 2.077 141 2 0.832 0.255 8.267 381 5 
Eugene OR 1.248 319 5 3.941 363 5 0.874 0.135 5.615 358 5 
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Evansville IN 0.573 7 1 2.126 149 2 0.836 0.092 0.275 143 2 
Fairbanks AK 0.655 29 1 5.709 382 5 0.873 0.057 -3.731 13 1 
Fargo ND 0.808 100 2 1.731 74 1 0.847 0.193 1.563 208 3 
Farmington NM 1.078 277 4 2.853 289 4 0.855 0.040 2.519 268 4 
Fayetteville NC 0.763 66 1 1.485 36 1 0.835 -0.031 0.355 148 2 
Fayetteville AR 0.805 96 2 4.157 368 5 0.970 0.233 7.112 375 5 
Flagstaff AZ 1.287 329 5 2.754 270 4 0.794 -0.075 2.174 242 4 
Flint MI 0.753 58 1 4.387 374 5 0.912 0.166 3.693 321 5 
Florence SC 0.851 61 1 1.402 29 1 0.730 0.338 0.746 168 3 
Florence AL 0.757 127 2 1.851 105 2 0.865 0.231 2.414 260 4 
Fond du Lac WI 1.002 234 4 2.027 133 2 0.738 0.011 -1.549 63 1 
Fort Collins CO 1.200 309 5 3.222 333 5 0.975 0.526 6.259 365 5 
Fort Smith AR 0.797 89 2 2.326 183 3 0.847 0.115 3.089 290 4 
Fort Wayne IN 0.704 38 1 2.672 254 4 0.858 0.327 3.293 300 4 
Fort Worth TX 0.896 157 3 1.519 43 1 0.943 -0.006 -2.453 40 1 
Fresno CA 1.075 276 4 3.198 331 5 0.833 -0.004 2.174 241 4 
Ft. Lauderdale FL 1.025 251 4 5.088 378 5 0.815 0.048 1.599 211 3 
Gadsden AL 0.978 215 3 1.842 101 2 0.813 0.020 0.708 164 3 
Gainesville GA 0.961 70 1 2.845 140 2 0.775 0.277 6.331 175 3 
Gainesville FL 0.772 202 3 2.072 288 4 0.779 0.042 0.879 367 5 
Gary IN 0.856 130 2 1.970 120 2 0.889 0.067 2.084 233 4 
Glens Falls NY 0.901 162 3 2.958 307 5 0.855 0.016 -1.242 75 1 
Goldsboro NC 0.800 90 2 1.608 54 1 0.738 0.083 0.976 179 3 
Grand Forks ND 1.013 242 4 1.900 110 2 0.460 -0.037 -3.287 25 1 
Grand Junction CO 0.896 158 3 5.445 380 5 0.983 0.070 0.770 169 3 
Grand Rapids MI 0.881 150 2 2.374 193 3 0.929 0.109 -0.681 96 2 
Great Falls MT 1.067 274 4 1.644 62 1 0.789 -0.083 0.186 137 2 
Greeley CO 0.801 91 2 2.716 264 4 0.848 0.330 3.230 298 4 
Green Bay WI 0.866 137 2 1.081 2 1 0.857 0.039 -0.187 119 2 
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Greensboro NC 0.889 153 2 1.740 75 1 0.982 0.047 -1.261 73 1 
Greenville NC 0.725 48 1 1.371 24 1 0.755 -0.109 0.666 36 1 
Greenville SC 0.884 152 2 3.439 344 5 0.985 0.100 -2.684 162 3 
Gulfport MS 1.022 248 4 2.533 226 3 0.658 -0.166 1.406 201 3 
Hagerstown MD 0.952 196 3 2.379 195 3 0.850 0.285 0.660 161 3 
Hanford CA 0.909 172 3 3.098 324 5 0.619 0.226 4.120 331 5 
Harrisburg PA 1.006 239 4 3.261 335 5 0.934 0.588 3.974 329 5 
Harrisonburg VA 1.073 275 4 2.083 142 2 0.945 0.189 3.182 296 4 
Hartford CT 1.355 346 5 2.659 252 4 0.831 0.077 0.419 152 2 
Hattiesburg MS 0.792 86 2 2.262 175 3 0.884 0.102 -0.090 125 2 
Hickory NC 0.933 181 3 1.435 31 1 0.935 0.393 2.348 254 4 
Hinesville GA 1.211 311 5 4.162 369 5 0.744 0.196 -1.160 78 1 
Holland MI 0.955 198 3 2.232 169 3 0.942 -0.012 3.628 317 5 
Honolulu HI 1.595 372 5 9.258 384 5 0.953 0.541 7.366 376 5 
Hot Springs AR 1.057 268 4 2.008 130 2 0.718 -0.033 3.123 294 4 
Houma LA 0.919 178 3 2.608 247 4 0.715 -0.100 5.211 351 5 
Houston TX 0.872 141 2 1.960 115 2 0.723 -0.149 1.216 189 3 
Huntington WV 0.881 151 2 2.201 163 3 0.791 0.119 -1.353 70 1 
Huntsville AL 0.776 71 1 0.980 1 1 0.968 0.200 3.545 314 5 
Idaho Falls ID 0.823 107 2 1.924 112 2 0.883 0.251 -5.266 6 1 
Indianapolis IN 0.987 219 3 1.460 33 1 0.925 0.437 3.772 325 5 
Iowa City IA 0.946 188 3 1.636 61 1 0.779 -0.005 2.072 232 4 
Ithaca NY 0.901 163 3 2.736 267 4 0.848 0.234 -1.675 61 1 
Jackson TN 0.971 14 1 2.217 37 1 0.879 0.553 4.549 8 1 
Jackson MI 0.612 19 1 3.510 165 3 0.958 0.239 3.866 327 5 
Jackson MS 0.625 209 3 1.490 347 5 0.884 0.134 -4.466 341 5 
Jacksonville NC 1.080 278 4 2.249 173 3 0.941 0.117 3.549 264 4 
Jacksonville FL 1.131 292 4 2.623 248 4 0.936 0.202 2.457 315 5 
Janesville WI 0.895 156 3 1.471 35 1 0.925 0.448 2.681 271 4 
 59 
Jefferson City MO 0.795 87 2 1.561 48 1 0.828 0.114 3.368 302 4 
Johnson City TN 1.062 270 4 1.670 67 1 0.972 0.523 5.340 352 5 
Johnstown PA 0.834 115 2 2.691 258 4 0.529 -0.093 -4.440 9 1 
Jonesboro AR 0.675 32 1 1.886 107 2 0.756 0.085 0.865 174 3 
Joplin MO 0.713 41 1 1.540 45 1 0.784 0.291 -3.193 26 1 
Kalamazoo MI 0.951 193 3 2.023 132 2 0.940 0.047 5.508 356 5 
Kankakee IL 1.130 291 4 1.850 104 2 0.862 -0.059 2.347 253 4 
Kansas City MO 0.970 208 3 1.653 64 1 0.914 0.350 1.539 207 3 
Kennewick WA 1.000 232 4 3.631 357 5 0.713 -0.180 -0.297 114 2 
Killeen TX 0.582 8 1 2.543 230 3 0.790 -0.083 -5.326 5 1 
Kingsport TN 0.951 194 3 1.841 100 2 0.791 0.133 0.525 156 3 
Kingston NY 1.018 246 4 2.928 303 4 0.753 0.010 2.195 244 4 
Knoxville TN 0.906 167 3 1.133 7 1 0.840 0.083 -3.359 22 1 
Kokomo IN 0.585 10 1 2.147 155 2 0.484 -0.139 -2.471 39 1 
La Crosse WI 0.987 220 3 1.177 8 1 0.817 0.006 3.754 324 5 
Lafayette LA 0.817 15 1 1.190 9 1 0.644 -0.182 1.264 190 3 
Lafayette IN 0.612 104 2 2.559 233 4 0.629 -0.119 2.022 230 3 
Lake Charles LA 0.938 183 3 2.412 204 3 0.895 0.013 -0.607 103 2 
Lake County IL 1.005 235 4 2.143 154 2 0.941 0.095 3.017 287 4 
Lake Havasu 
City 
AZ 0.781 76 1 3.162 328 5 0.862 0.130 5.943 363 5 
Lakeland FL 0.716 43 1 2.759 272 4 0.847 0.100 6.884 371 5 
Lancaster PA 0.995 226 3 2.459 212 3 0.947 0.132 2.834 277 4 
Lansing MI 0.851 128 2 2.968 309 5 0.864 -0.078 -1.301 71 1 
Laredo TX 0.666 31 1 2.826 282 4 0.847 -0.148 0.216 139 2 
Las Cruces NM 0.823 108 2 1.839 99 2 0.824 0.101 3.516 313 5 
Las Vegas NV 0.750 56 1 4.303 372 5 0.735 0.240 4.830 348 5 
Lawrence KS 1.054 267 4 1.784 85 2 0.876 0.147 2.928 280 4 
Lawton OK 0.806 97 2 2.549 232 4 0.849 0.054 2.412 259 4 
Lebanon PA 0.997 229 3 1.999 128 2 0.676 0.343 -2.508 38 1 
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Lewiston ID 1.286 175 3 2.094 145 2 0.632 0.166 0.127 131 2 
Lewiston ME 0.914 328 5 2.696 259 4 0.876 0.108 0.775 170 3 
Lexington KY 0.795 88 2 2.690 257 4 0.855 0.410 -0.675 99 2 
Lima OH 0.716 44 1 1.962 117 2 0.813 0.097 4.578 342 5 
Lincoln NE 0.801 92 2 1.669 66 1 0.918 0.091 0.500 154 2 
Little Rock AR 0.949 189 3 2.469 215 3 0.826 0.376 1.046 184 3 
Logan UT 1.063 271 4 1.988 124 2 0.724 0.099 -0.679 97 2 
Longview WA 0.644 25 1 2.661 253 4 0.727 -0.231 4.030 330 5 
Longview TX 1.023 249 4 5.746 383 5 0.966 0.100 6.257 364 5 
Los Angeles CA 1.736 380 5 2.839 286 4 0.558 -0.339 2.172 239 4 
Louisville KY 1.122 289 4 1.350 22 1 0.955 0.190 1.296 193 3 
Lubbock TX 0.607 12 1 2.579 239 4 0.955 0.124 -3.671 17 1 
Lynchburg VA 1.024 250 4 1.578 51 1 0.958 0.215 5.011 349 5 
Macon GA 0.908 169 3 2.705 263 4 0.922 -0.034 -1.708 59 1 
Madera CA 0.879 146 2 3.548 351 5 0.826 -0.121 8.208 380 5 
Madison WI 1.115 286 4 2.327 184 3 0.867 0.074 -0.056 127 2 
Manchester NH 1.214 313 5 2.420 207 3 0.918 0.051 -1.910 54 1 
Manhattan KS 1.032 256 4 2.833 285 4 0.755 -0.013 -3.702 16 1 
Mankato MN 1.007 240 4 1.787 87 2 0.937 0.053 0.982 180 3 
Mansfield OH 0.770 69 1 2.248 172 3 0.636 0.025 -0.337 112 2 
McAllen TX 0.541 4 1 3.393 341 5 0.921 0.202 1.472 205 3 
Medford OR 1.177 305 4 3.127 326 5 0.933 0.276 3.274 299 4 
Memphis TN 0.889 154 2 3.081 322 5 0.943 0.058 1.716 215 3 
Merced CA 0.790 84 2 4.674 376 5 0.889 0.111 2.937 282 4 
Miami FL 1.308 336 5 3.823 361 5 0.935 0.106 -0.133 124 2 
Michigan City IN 1.064 272 4 2.373 192 3 0.898 0.064 7.098 374 5 
Midland TX 0.493 2 1 2.869 293 4 0.742 -0.083 4.516 340 5 
Milwaukee WI 1.047 262 4 1.755 79 1 0.945 0.508 5.614 357 5 
Minneapolis MN 1.213 312 5 1.814 95 2 0.900 -0.025 -0.616 102 2 
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Missoula MT 1.439 362 5 2.860 292 4 0.993 0.316 -0.682 95 2 
Mobile AL 0.855 129 2 2.844 287 4 0.956 0.217 1.288 192 3 
Modesto CA 1.005 236 4 4.006 364 5 0.820 0.168 2.994 286 4 
Monroe MI 0.780 75 1 1.852 106 2 0.797 0.227 0.240 140 2 
Monroe LA 0.959 201 3 2.726 266 4 0.930 0.136 3.468 312 5 
Montgomery AL 0.617 17 1 1.283 15 1 0.853 0.159 -0.894 86 2 
Morgantown WV 0.998 230 3 2.333 186 3 0.645 -0.182 2.098 235 4 
Morristown TN 0.937 182 3 1.609 55 1 0.775 0.032 0.502 155 2 
Mount Vernon WA 1.424 357 5 3.485 346 5 0.940 0.003 0.380 150 2 
Muncie IN 0.553 5 1 2.007 129 2 0.622 -0.107 -5.328 4 1 
Muskegon MI 0.817 105 2 1.697 69 1 0.867 0.142 -1.178 77 1 
Myrtle Beach SC 0.879 147 2 2.174 159 3 0.878 -0.045 -1.896 56 1 
Napa CA 1.424 358 5 2.989 312 5 0.838 0.158 3.463 310 5 
Naples FL 0.956 199 3 3.544 350 5 0.649 -0.318 1.046 183 3 
Nashville TN 1.042 259 4 1.553 47 1 0.963 0.234 0.072 130 2 
Nassau NY 1.680 377 5 2.389 198 3 0.798 0.144 0.532 157 3 
New Haven CT 1.399 355 5 2.674 255 4 0.832 0.211 -0.584 104 2 
New Orleans LA 1.087 279 4 2.153 156 3 0.855 0.292 2.428 263 4 
New York NY 1.673 375 5 2.428 208 3 0.638 -0.085 1.319 195 3 
Newark NJ 1.574 370 5 2.321 181 3 0.677 -0.166 1.994 228 3 
Niles MI 1.184 307 5 1.762 81 2 0.757 -0.168 -0.571 106 2 
North Port FL 1.014 243 4 4.257 371 5 0.699 -0.084 3.639 318 5 
Norwich CT 1.001 233 4 2.279 177 3 0.887 0.342 0.130 132 2 
Oakland CA 1.699 378 5 2.638 250 4 0.577 -0.115 0.744 167 3 
Ocala FL 0.722 47 1 2.808 278 4 0.776 0.103 -0.071 126 2 
Ocean City NJ 1.477 366 5 2.829 284 4 0.831 -0.028 3.466 311 5 
Odessa TX 0.430 1 1 3.843 362 5 0.726 -0.099 5.413 353 5 
Ogden UT 0.974 212 3 2.931 304 4 0.952 0.167 3.948 328 5 
Oklahoma City OK 0.944 187 3 2.203 164 3 0.851 0.194 1.668 213 3 
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Olympia WA 1.290 330 5 3.530 349 5 0.979 0.112 1.613 212 3 
Omaha NE 0.904 166 3 2.597 244 4 0.873 0.154 1.298 194 3 
Orlando FL 1.106 284 4 2.682 256 4 0.798 0.245 -0.751 92 2 
Oshkosh WI 0.846 123 2 1.332 19 1 0.912 0.313 2.979 283 4 
Owensboro KY 0.727 50 1 2.289 179 3 0.697 -0.101 2.932 281 4 
Oxnard CA 1.635 374 5 2.991 313 5 0.768 0.099 2.353 255 4 
Palm Bay FL 0.830 111 2 4.069 365 5 0.821 -0.015 4.499 339 5 
Palm Coast FL 0.619 18 1 3.604 355 5 0.816 -0.163 -0.580 105 2 
Panama City FL 0.919 179 3 2.895 300 4 0.856 0.179 8.038 379 5 
Parkersburg WV 0.847 124 2 1.901 111 2 0.872 0.147 -0.618 101 2 
Pascagoula MS 1.087 280 4 2.196 161 3 0.747 0.115 3.391 304 4 
Peabody MA 1.480 367 5 2.485 218 3 0.856 0.141 -1.394 69 1 
Pensacola FL 0.860 132 2 2.247 171 3 0.798 -0.036 2.014 229 3 
Peoria IL 0.641 23 1 4.077 366 5 0.900 0.175 9.310 383 5 
Philadelphia PA 1.343 343 5 1.742 77 1 0.749 -0.113 2.172 240 4 
Phoenix AZ 1.104 283 4 2.979 310 5 0.726 -0.026 4.721 345 5 
Pine Bluff AR 0.785 79 1 2.346 188 3 0.774 0.207 2.224 246 4 
Pittsburgh PA 1.005 237 4 1.998 127 2 0.957 0.409 1.779 218 3 
Pittsfield MA 0.898 160 3 2.937 306 4 0.970 0.051 2.360 256 4 
Pocatello ID 1.116 287 4 1.745 78 1 0.968 0.170 0.732 166 3 
Port St. Lucie FL 0.783 77 1 4.322 373 5 0.924 -0.028 3.061 288 4 
Portland ME 1.356 347 5 2.083 143 2 0.853 0.075 1.972 226 3 
Portland OR 1.457 363 5 2.386 197 3 0.862 0.067 4.181 334 5 
Poughkeepsie NY 1.252 321 5 3.027 315 5 0.947 0.220 -0.733 93 2 
Prescott AZ 1.036 258 4 2.566 236 4 0.916 0.331 1.124 186 3 
Providence RI 1.476 365 5 2.753 269 4 0.915 0.142 -0.181 120 2 
Provo UT 0.990 221 3 2.402 202 3 0.960 0.308 10.469 384 5 
Pueblo CO 0.803 95 2 4.139 367 5 0.925 0.377 3.162 295 4 
Punta Gorda FL 0.759 62 1 3.562 353 5 0.817 0.072 3.738 323 5 
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Racine WI 0.965 204 3 1.374 25 1 0.865 0.083 2.986 285 4 
Raleigh NC 1.098 281 4 1.628 58 1 0.949 -0.008 3.406 305 4 
Rapid City SD 1.245 318 5 1.775 83 2 0.864 0.117 -2.758 34 1 
Reading PA 0.983 217 3 2.523 224 3 0.964 0.340 -1.570 62 1 
Redding CA 0.879 148 2 3.063 319 5 0.947 0.388 -1.395 68 1 
Reno NV 0.789 82 2 2.907 302 4 0.834 0.296 0.336 146 2 
Richmond VA 1.149 297 4 1.783 84 2 0.889 0.226 0.861 173 3 
Riverside CA 1.296 332 5 3.438 343 5 0.713 0.177 -1.260 74 1 
Roanoke VA 1.384 353 5 3.614 356 5 0.927 0.215 6.352 368 5 
Rochester NY 0.825 109 2 1.344 20 1 0.848 0.104 2.182 35 1 
Rochester MN 0.863 134 2 1.784 86 2 0.671 -0.001 -2.716 243 4 
Rockford IL 0.763 67 1 2.540 228 3 0.875 0.220 2.712 273 4 
Rockingham 
County 
NH 1.183 306 4 2.320 180 3 0.943 0.066 -0.379 110 2 
Rocky Mount NC 0.630 20 1 1.790 88 2 0.776 -0.054 1.393 200 3 
Rome GA 0.848 125 2 2.439 210 3 0.696 0.112 1.807 220 3 
Sacramento CA 1.354 345 5 2.894 299 4 0.649 -0.176 2.980 284 4 
Saginaw MI 0.637 22 1 1.986 123 2 0.749 0.102 4.324 336 5 
Salem OR 1.138 294 4 2.771 273 4 0.934 0.582 1.920 224 3 
Salinas CA 1.336 340 5 3.570 354 5 0.613 0.044 1.866 222 3 
Salisbury MD 0.998 231 4 2.372 191 3 0.349 -0.136 1.415 202 3 
Salt Lake City UT 1.274 327 5 2.413 205 3 0.968 0.121 3.851 326 5 
San Angelo TX 0.740 54 1 2.804 277 4 0.783 -0.017 -1.504 65 1 
San Antonio TX 0.784 78 1 3.354 339 5 0.866 0.266 5.040 350 5 
San Diego CA 1.541 369 5 3.013 314 5 0.868 -0.114 0.253 141 2 
San Francisco CA 1.892 384 5 2.540 229 3 0.638 -0.143 -2.069 50 1 
San Jose CA 1.877 383 5 2.789 274 4 0.759 0.123 -2.379 42 1 
San Luis 
Obispo 
CA 1.303 334 5 3.326 337 5 0.637 -0.134 -0.826 88 2 
Sandusky OH 0.863 135 2 2.855 290 4 0.853 0.023 3.731 322 5 
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Santa Ana CA 1.674 376 5 2.718 265 4 0.626 0.051 -1.713 58 1 
Santa Barbara CA 1.470 364 5 2.879 295 4 0.779 0.090 0.256 142 2 
Santa Cruz CA 1.599 373 5 3.093 323 5 0.657 0.065 2.422 262 4 
Santa Fe NM 1.101 282 4 2.032 135 2 0.819 0.195 3.650 319 5 
Santa Rosa CA 1.590 371 5 2.855 291 4 0.678 0.251 0.990 182 3 
Savannah GA 1.223 315 5 2.513 222 3 0.932 0.295 2.239 247 4 
Scranton PA 1.264 324 5 2.351 190 3 0.885 0.252 1.373 198 3 
Seattle WA 1.744 382 5 2.508 220 3 0.925 0.271 2.038 231 4 
Sebastian FL 0.711 40 1 3.554 352 5 0.770 0.108 4.677 343 5 
Sheboygan WI 0.949 190 3 1.390 27 1 0.845 0.019 2.152 238 4 
Sherman TX 0.533 3 1 2.887 297 4 0.843 0.031 -2.842 33 1 
Shreveport LA 0.582 9 1 1.711 71 1 0.865 0.006 0.159 135 2 
Sioux City IA 0.910 174 3 1.721 73 1 0.618 -0.170 -0.643 100 2 
Sioux Falls SD 0.894 155 2 1.810 94 2 0.834 0.152 -0.559 107 2 
South Bend IN 0.876 145 2 1.353 23 1 0.866 0.194 1.774 217 3 
Spartanburg SC 0.801 93 2 1.391 28 1 0.832 0.105 3.112 291 4 
Spokane WA 1.159 300 4 2.696 260 4 0.877 -0.095 1.088 185 3 
Springfield IL 0.702 37 1 1.089 3 1 0.897 0.057 8.489 12 1 
Springfield MA 1.293 63 1 2.605 4 1 0.852 0.088 4.770 129 2 
Springfield OH 0.759 138 2 1.082 217 3 0.888 0.032 0.067 347 5 
Springfield MO 0.870 331 5 2.475 246 4 0.717 -0.069 -3.873 382 5 
St. Cloud MN 0.971 210 3 1.575 50 1 0.748 -0.091 -0.676 98 2 
St. George UT 0.842 120 2 3.517 348 5 0.835 0.005 1.517 206 3 
St. Joseph MO 1.017 245 4 1.994 126 2 0.545 -0.404 1.933 225 3 
St. Louis MO 1.139 295 4 3.304 336 5 0.927 0.138 7.950 378 5 
State College PA 0.950 192 3 1.650 63 1 0.635 -0.113 -1.534 64 1 
Steubenville WV 0.777 72 1 2.881 296 4 0.638 -0.038 4.716 344 5 
Stockton CA 1.050 266 4 3.696 359 5 0.669 0.238 -0.537 108 2 
Sumter SC 0.842 121 2 1.805 92 2 0.816 -0.046 -1.999 51 1 
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Syracuse NY 1.014 244 4 1.793 89 2 0.786 0.214 -3.324 23 1 
Tacoma WA 1.425 359 5 2.460 213 3 0.929 0.035 -0.210 118 2 
Tallahassee FL 0.908 170 3 2.328 185 3 0.914 0.180 2.861 279 4 
Tampa FL 1.117 288 4 2.597 245 4 0.744 -0.190 -2.146 48 1 
Terre Haute IN 0.643 24 1 2.139 153 2 0.764 0.238 -0.785 89 2 
Texarkana TX 0.779 74 1 1.713 72 1 0.697 -0.170 -4.316 10 1 
Toledo OH 0.717 45 1 2.934 305 4 0.965 0.439 2.414 261 4 
Topeka KS 0.754 59 1 1.815 96 2 0.823 0.084 2.331 250 4 
Trenton NJ 1.324 338 5 2.470 216 3 0.834 0.242 0.910 176 3 
Tucson AZ 1.203 310 5 4.682 377 5 0.844 -0.037 0.704 163 3 
Tulsa OK 0.907 168 3 1.969 119 2 0.799 0.243 0.804 172 3 
Tuscaloosa AL 0.994 224 3 1.293 16 1 0.954 0.140 -0.768 91 2 
Tyler TX 0.568 6 1 2.087 144 2 0.592 -0.290 -1.031 81 2 
Utica NY 0.840 118 2 2.389 199 3 0.653 -0.304 -0.952 84 2 
Valdosta GA 0.914 176 3 2.071 139 2 0.855 -0.010 -0.143 123 2 
Vallejo CA 1.133 293 4 3.419 342 5 0.796 0.074 -2.146 47 1 
Victoria TX 0.760 65 1 2.063 138 2 0.787 -0.107 -0.237 116 2 
Vineland NJ 1.146 296 4 2.821 281 4 0.886 -0.052 -3.110 28 1 
Virginia Beach VA 1.379 352 5 1.985 122 2 0.733 -0.085 0.214 138 2 
Visalia CA 0.872 142 2 3.244 334 5 0.828 -0.013 3.380 303 4 
Waco TX 0.610 13 1 2.109 147 2 0.357 -0.616 -1.185 76 1 
Warner Robins GA 0.644 26 1 1.465 34 1 0.682 -0.018 2.302 248 4 
Warren MI 0.968 207 3 2.322 182 3 0.927 0.110 1.372 197 3 
Washington DC 1.411 356 5 2.101 146 2 0.569 -0.025 -3.617 18 1 
Waterloo IA 1.128 290 4 2.738 268 4 0.457 -0.511 -3.028 30 1 
Wausau WI 0.971 211 3 1.623 57 1 0.597 -0.037 -0.159 122 2 
Wenatchee WA 1.161 301 4 2.795 276 4 0.976 0.090 4.428 338 5 
West Palm 
Beach 
FL 1.113 285 4 2.902 301 4 0.911 0.156 3.084 289 4 
Wheeling WV 0.871 139 2 3.177 329 5 0.638 -0.301 2.796 275 4 
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Wichita KS 0.648 27 1 2.545 231 4 0.733 0.156 1.160 187 3 
Wichita Falls TX 0.806 98 2 1.804 91 2 0.697 0.159 -3.458 21 1 
Williamsport PA 0.809 102 2 1.937 113 2 0.829 0.080 -0.018 128 2 
Wilmington NC 1.269 323 5 2.255 108 2 0.796 -0.061 -1.902 55 1 
Wilmington DE 1.257 326 5 1.889 174 3 0.825 0.061 5.477 355 5 
Winchester VA 0.751 57 1 2.958 308 5 0.840 0.107 1.275 191 3 
Winston NC 0.880 149 2 1.630 60 1 0.857 -0.075 3.410 306 4 
Worcester MA 1.376 351 5 2.561 234 4 0.970 0.314 -0.160 121 2 
Yakima WA 1.156 299 4 2.159 157 3 0.914 0.286 4.177 333 5 
York PA 1.042 260 4 1.509 40 1 0.800 0.114 -0.984 82 2 
Youngstown OH 0.821 106 2 1.533 44 1 0.957 0.369 0.937 177 3 
Yuba City CA 0.833 113 2 3.448 345 5 0.579 0.030 5.775 361 5 
Yuma AZ 0.862 133 2 2.808 279 4 0.873 0.252 5.885 362 5 
 
Notes: Details for 3 integration measures (Mean, Sigma and R-Square Trend t-stat) are 
presented for all 384 MSAs.  Mean is the average quarterly house price return.  We compute 
house price returns for each MSA in our sample as the log quarterly difference in its FHFA 
repeat home sales price index.  Sigma is the standard deviation of returns.  R-Squares are 
the estimates of integration and are used to obtain R-Square trend t-statistics.  R-Squares 
are obtained from fitting MSA returns to the factor model described in Appendix Table 1.  
The time trend t-statistics are estimated by regressing the R-squares for each MSA on a 
simple linear time trend for all available quarters of data.  The final R-Squares pertain to 
2010:Q1 for all 384 US MSAs.  The change in R-Squares refers to the difference between 
estimates for 2010:Q1 and 1983:Q4 for each MSA.  Each characteristic is ranked from 
lowest to highest in comparison to all 384 US MSAs.  Each characteristic is also binned by 
quintile in comparison to all 384 US MSAs.      
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Appendix Figure 1 
 Factor Model Betas 
 
Panel A: Interest Rate Factor for California Inland and Coastal MSAs 
 
 
Panel B: Unemployment Factor for California Inland and Coastal MSAs 
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Panel C: Income Factor for California Inland and Coastal MSAs 
 
 
Notes: The factor betas are from the multi-factor housing returns model fitted for California 
MSAs using a 20-quarter moving window.  Factors betas are given for interest rates (Fed 
Funds rate), unemployment (unemployment rate) and income (personal income).  Factor 
betas are presented for 1983:Q4 – 2010:Q1 for California Interior MSAs and California Coast 
MSAs. California Coastal MSAs include Los Angeles, Oakland, Oxnard, San Diego, San 
Francisco, San Jose, San Luis Obispo, Santa Ana, Santa Barbara and Santa Cruz with the 
remainder of the 28 MSAs categorized as California Inland MSAs. 
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